THE FOUNDING OF MADRAS

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Preface

I have undertaken to tell the story of the founding of Madras not only because the last book on the subject was written in 1939 but also because what may, without paradox, be called the Indian aspect of the story has been largely ignored. The history of the founding of the city has been written mainly on the basis of English records, and comparatively little allowance has been made for Indian records and traditions. These are not plentiful, but where they are available they are often important.

As an example, a Telugu poem says clearly that Damarla Venkatapathi established a town named Chennapatnam after his father. This statement has been ignored in the discussions on the origin of the name of 'Madras'. If it is accepted, as it should be, it places the problem in perspective.

I have ventured to put forward opinions on a few issues which are at variance with those generally accepted. These concern the relative location of Chennapatnam, Madraspatam and Fort St. George and the origins of the negotiations which brought Damarla Venkatapathi or his brother into contact with Francis Day. The notion that Day received the 'firman' from Venkata III or Venkatapathi at the palace in Chandragiri is a popular misconception.

I have attempted to place the story of the founding in its background of Vijayanagar and Golconda history. Knowledge of this history serves to explain some puzzling incidents. I trust that the reader will gain the impression, after reading this monograph, that all the personalities acted as they did for natural, and even inevitable, reasons.

I have not cluttered up the pages with footnotes. But, as I have said in the bibliographical note, every statement of fact is based on one or other of the books cited there. Needless to say, I have also consulted a number of subsidiary sources. Since no records prior to 1670 have survived in Madras, what should have been the principal source has been placed out of court.

A few illustrations taken from contemporary or near-contemporary prints have been added.

N. S. RAMASWAMI

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

India in the Seventeenth Century
—From Sir William Foster's '*England's Quest of Eastern Trade*'

1

Lure of Trade

The founding of Madras was an important, though unwitting, step in the making of the British Indian empire. The factors who built Fort St. George in 1640 had little thought beyond trade. But they were the unconscious instruments of that great event in the modern history of the world, the creation of Britain's eastern empire. Merchants do not become rulers by accident. Though they were unaware of the part they were going to play, their work was fashioned by historical forces, and the result was an inevitable one. The apparent fortuitousness of it all is an illusion.

One great historical force brought the English traders to the Coromandal coast, and another made them rulers of an empire. A detailed study of the years from 1640 to 1658, by which time the city had become the chief British settlement on the east coast, is an essential part of any account of British India's growth.

What brought the subjects of the 'wisest fool in Christendom', King James I, to India was the lure of trade. International trade has been a stronger force in world relationships than is generally realised. At the beginning of the Christian era, Greek and Roman mariners and merchants had thronged the Indian ports in search of spices. The same impulse brought Europeans of a later century to our shores. This time they came to stay.

Almost the first words which the Portuguese heard on their arrival at Calicut was an abrupt address in Castilian by two Moorish traders from Tunis: 'May the Devil take thee! What brought you hither?' The surprise was justified. The Arabs had monopolised the eastern trade for centuries, though the Genoese and the Venetians were strong competitors. Shifting politics made the Italians'

ventures only fitfully effective. The Arabs could not be easily displaced, and they never were until Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and brought Europe with him by the south-east passage. The idea of the north-west and north-east passages was rendered obsolete. The European centuries in Asia began, to end only in our own time.

Some historians suggest that after the battle of the Adyar, when a few Frenchmen routed a huge army of the Nawab of the Carnatic, percipient Europeans realised that they, and not the Indians, held the levers of power. This was in the eighteenth century. It was as suppliants that the foreign traders came to India in the sixteenth century and it was on sufferance that for a long time they plied their trade. The fortunes of the Englishmen at Fort St. George were subject to the political changes on the eastern coast, which were considerable. The region passed first from Vijayanagar to Golconda and then from Golconda to the Mughals. At every change the English had to have their privileges confirmed.

Fort St. George was involved in an uphill struggle for quite some time in its early career. This was also due to conditions in England where the civil war between King and Parliament was raging when the fort began to be built in 1640. The directors had to fight battles to preserve their charter. This struggle was a chequered one. The effects were felt in India. The directors, finding it difficult enough to maintain their existence, were considerably annoyed when their servants in India proposed to embark on an expensive venture like building a fort. They called Andrew Cogan, one of the two factors mainly responsible, to account. Though they finally cleared him of the charge on the legitimate ground that many others too bore responsibility, they were indignant with their servants.

Thus, the background to a study of the foundations of Madras is the civil war in England and the civil war and invasions on the Coromandal coast. Between them, these two factors explain much that may seem obscure in the story of the founding. The company in England has been accused of being so intent on earning dividends that it could not look beyond the ledger book and of being foolishly obstinate in wanting to obstruct the building of the fort. In fact, any body of persons in the position in which it found itself would have acted as it did.

The east coast factors' experiences varied from settlement to settlement. Frequently in their letters they complained of harassment by Golconda officers at Masulipatam, where their first factory was established. They were certainly subject to a somewhat rigorous control. Their representative at the court in Golconda was in reality a hostage for their good behaviour. When Captain Weddell, who belonged to the rival English company, the 'Curtenians', fired into Masulipatam and killed many inhabitants, the representative was imprisoned. At another level of control we read of the European factors being ordered off their warehouses when the Sultan and his harem visited them to make purchases.

The Golconda historian puts a different construction upon the alleged harassment. He considers it no more than the kind of control any sovereign prince is entitled to exercise. English historians also recognise that the factors sometimes misused their privileges. A common practice was to pass off as the company's goods, entitled to a lower customs duty, those of the Sultan's subjects, a complaint the Nawabs of Bengal also made against English merchants at a later time. Moreover, the factors 'were apt to be overbearing, and not too scrupulous in their dealings with the natives.' In 1639 the King of Golconda complained to Cogan that the Masulipatam factors had maltreated his subjects.

But that the English felt themselves oppressed and harassed at Masulipatam is clear enough. They abandoned that factory and betook themselves to Armagon. They were induced to return to Masulipatam after a time, and they were very glad to do so. If there is one fact which shines out strong and clear in their correspondence at this time, it is that they absolutely detested Armagon.

Apart from its natural deficiencies like an exposed and shallow roadstead, the factors allege oppression by the local Naik, who 'pilled and polled' the 'painters' intolerably. There may be some truth in this allegation. Probably, however, it was the covert but unremitting hostility of the Dutch from nearby Pulicat that was at the back of the Englishmen's troubles. The seventeenth century was the Dutch century in the eastern waters, as the sixteenth had been the Portuguese. From Pulicat, the Dutch placed obstacles in the way of English trade. Moreover, the English suffered from a scarcity of money with which to make 'investments'.

The English complaints against Armagon were the loudest when Francis Day was the chief there. Was it a coincidence that it

was he who was the leading advocate of the change to Madraspatam? He it was who visited the site and secured a 'firman' from the Naik of Wandiwash, Damarla Venkatapathi, under whose jurisdiction the site lay, a little to the south of Chennapatnam, a town or village which the Naik had a few years before established in memory of his father, a magnate of the Vijayanagar empire. Day was quite extraordinarily insistent on abandoning Armagon and settling down at Madraspatam. On at least two occasions he offered to be responsible for the interest on loans the English, always embarrassed for money, had to contract to forward the work.

It is commonly said that it was Damarla Venkatapathi, or his brother, Damarla Ayappa, then governing from Poonamallee, who invited the English to settle down at Madraspatam. The 'firman' which Day secured does, in fact, make this statement. The text of the 'firman' now available is an English translation from the 'Gentue' language in which the original, authenticated by the Naik or his brother, was written. Is it far-fetched to suggest that Day introduced this statement to make the Naik's offer more attractive to his superiors? The local English went to great lengths to induce them to accept the offer. On one occasion they exaggerated the importance of the Cooum, declaring it to be navigable by ships. On another occasion they said that salt could be manufactured at the island, near the fort, a statement which would appeal to their commercial masters.

If the Naik wanted the English in his dominions, the English wanted a site in Madraspatam much more badly. Day, in particular, was frantic.

Surat presidency, which elaborately dissociated itself from any responsibility for the choice of the site and the building of the fort, was apt to suspect the Naik's motives in offering generous terms. These terms were certainly generous, but not incredible. The Naik, or his Vijayanagar suzerain, wanted to import horses for the army, and he might also have believed that the fort of the foreigners would be a haven in troubled times. There is nothing extraordinary about this. Even oppressive Golconda invited the English to return to Masulipatam from Armagon.

The available evidence points to the possibility of the English having made the overtures, not the Naik. It was common knowledge on the coast that they wanted to be rid of Armagon. Day considered Covelong, Pondicherry and Kunimedu. The Portuguese

at Santhome invited the English to settle down in their midst, in no altruistic spirit, as the latter rightly suspected. Nothing is more likely than that it was the English who sounded the Naik. He must have been glad to comply. He had his own reasons. But they were not so overpowering that he had to invite the English to settle down in his dominions.

After all, Venkatapathi had, only a few years before Fort St. George was built, established the town of Chennapatnam a few hundred yards to its north in order to 'separate' the Pulicat Dutch and the Santhome Portuguese, of whose perpetual quarrels he was becoming tired. He could have had no particular object in wanting a second settlement so near his own. When Day chose his site, he was merely not concerned to object.

Neglect of available Indian evidence and traditions has distorted the early history of Madras in some particulars. It is true that Bundla Ramaswami Nayudu is no reliable chronicler. But not all Indian evidence is untrustworthy. There is a clear statement in *Ushaparinayam*, a Telugu poem written by Ankabhupala, a half-brother of Venkatapathi, that the latter set up a town named after their father, Chennappa, that would act as a 'buffer' between Pulicat and Santhome, then perpetually fighting each other. This statement ought to claim precedence over any other, and it must be accepted that Chennapatnam already existed when Day landed at nearby Madraspatam.

This fact which, though known to many of the earlier writers in this century, has been underestimated is actually of capital importance. Within a few hundred yards of Madraspatam which too already existed was the town or village of Chennapatnam. Notions that Venkatapathi requested Day to name the new town Day was establishing after Chennappa and that Sriranga III, the last Vijayanagar emperor, was cheated in his wish that the town be named after himself are beside the point.

There has been much speculation about the relative location of Chennapatnam, Madraspatam and Fort St. George. Those who are familiar with the city of Madras will be surprised at this. All the three sites and structures are within a few hundred yards of each other. An area comprising modern Georgetown and the Fort would not be more than four square miles in extent, and the area comprising the old 'Black Town' and the Fort was much smaller.

Of the four persons intimately connected with the founding,

the Damarla brothers are shadowy figures. It is not possible even to trace their career in detail. But the extensive evidence of the English letters to Surat, Bantam and London enables the historian to make out what kind of men Andrew Cogan and Francis Day were. Cogan was much the more important figure. When the East India Company was asked to associate a knight with one of its enterprises, it begged to be excused on the ground that the high-born were out of place in its midst. Cogan lived to be made a baronet. That was an empty honour and the poor man died in want. Very little is known of what happened to Day after he finally returned to England.

The story of the founding of Madras is more than an accumulation of relevant extracts from the records. It is certainly interesting to read the Stuart prose even of these merchants, none of them a Milton or a Ben Jonson. But it is more instructive to search for the man behind his words. Some have lamented that the British set up no memorials of any kind in Madras to its two founders. Equally deplorable is the fact that no attempt has been made to make out what manner of men the two were. There is ample evidence for Cogan. Though Day is not so well provided, the task is not hopeless.

There is a notion that Day received the 'firman' from the 'Raja of Chandragiri', in reality Emperor Venkata III, at Chandragiri, then the Vijayanagar capital. But Day only says that he met the Naik of Wandiwash. He might also have met Damarla Ayappa. But there is no suggestion that he had an audience of the emperor or that he journeyed to Chandragiri. The meeting probably took place at Chennapatnam, where the 'firman' was handed over.

The English and the other Europeans bartered Indian goods, mainly cloth, for spices and other agricultural produce in south-east Asia, which they sold in Europe. They paid for the Indian goods with bullion. This was called the 'investment'.

The Indian goods they bought included 'Masulipatam chintz', a kind of 'painted' cloth, then very much sought after in many parts of the world and made nowhere else. The madder or vegetable dye which lent it its particular distinction grew only at a few places near Masulipatam. Another valuable article the Europeans bought was diamonds. The 'Koh-i-noor' was mined in a Golconda field.

The question is why this Indian governments could not themselves exploit these commercial advantages. They had few

ships and could, therefore, carry on little foreign trade. They also seem to have lacked the necessary expertise. Nor could they make significant exports. But the English factors frequently complained that local dealers manipulated prices. It was to counter this that the Europeans set up 'factories'.

In the seventeenth century this term denoted either a group of European merchants living at a centre for regular trading or the buildings where they lived and carried on business. 'Factories' were not new. They had existed in medieval Europe, as in the Hanseatic 'factories' in London. European traders found that 'factories' were indispensable in the east. When a foreign ship arrived, its cargo had to be sold and a return cargo purchased, both within a short time. This fact was a temptation to the local merchants to form combinations to force down the buying prices and to raise the selling ones. The only remedy was to maintain agents on the spot who would sell their own goods and buy the products of the country at the best possible prices, and keep the latter in readiness for the next ship.

2
Rivals

On July 27, 1639, an English ship, *The Eagle*, dropped anchor somewhere between Tiruvotriyur and Santhome, and a merchant landed on the surf-beaten beach at a small town or village named Madraspatam. He was conducted to the ruler of the region, and was 'entertained with much Honour.' He held discussions, as he wrote later, with 'Merchants, Painters and Weavers, who brought me musters of all their sorts of Cloath.' He made detailed inquiries about the prices as he travelled about the Naik's territory. On completing his mission he returned to his ship and sailed north. It was thus that Francis Day set the history of Madras in motion.

The Eagle was not a very appropriate name for the ship. The English did not descend on the coast with drums beating or banners flying. They came purely as merchants in search of profit. But nothing can be more dramatic than the historical forces which initially brought Europeans to India. This was not their first coming in force. In the early centuries of the Christian era Greek and Roman traders and sailors had thronged Indian ports. The trade then was quite considerable in volume, much to the annoyance of some Roman patriots. This commerce gradually dwindled and finally disappeared. The reason was the collapse of the Roman empire and the emergence of the Arabs. When, however, in 1498, Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and brought Europe in communication with India by sea, outflanking the Arabs, the stage was set for the second entry of the Europeans.

On the Coromandal coast the Portuguese established themselves at Santhome not earlier than 1522, the Dutch at Masulipatam in 1605, the English at the same town in 1611, and the Danes

at Tranquebar in 1620. The French founded Pondicherry after the English had settled down at Madras. These nations were attracted by trade, just as their predecessors in the centuries long gone by had been.

When the Portuguese first arrived in India, in 1498, they found the Venetians in complete monopoly of Indo-European commerce. Alexandria, which figure so largely in the maritime and commercial annals of the first centuries of the Christian era, was lost to the Greeks when the Arabs conquered Iran and Egypt. It had for long been the Greeks' main centre for their considerable Indian trade. The Arabs were quick to realise that they could make enormous gains from eastern trade and 'entered upon the pursuit of mercantile enterprise with the same ardour which had characterised their efforts as warriors. They speedily 'outstripped the limits of previous nautical investigation and imported many of the most costly commodities of the East from the countries which produced them.' Basrah, which Caliph Omar founded on the western bank of the Shat-el-Arab, became a 'station scarcely inferior to Alexandria for the shipping engaged in the Indian trade.'

Europe was now deprived of the benefits of eastern commerce except for a 'small inland trade established through Tartary.' But with Venice's rise the old channel of intercourse with India through Egypt was restored. After the Crusades, European merchants settled down at Acre, Aleppo and other Syrian towns and acquired many commercial privileges. Venice, Genoa, Amalfi, Pisa and Florence 'entirely engrossed the Indian trade.'

A strong competition arose between Genoa and Venice to control this trade. The Genoese, in alliance with the Greeks, expelled the Venetian merchants from Constantinople. The Venetians retaliated by securing from the Pope a bull of dispensation allowing them to open free trade with infidels. Their Indian trade was established more solidly than before.

The Genoese were finally expelled from Constantinople when Mohammed II conquered Greece, and the great city could no longer act as a mart for the supply of Indian goods to the west. The trade fell into the hands of the Egyptians and Syrians subject to the Mamelukes. The Venetians, who had commercial treaties with these princes, commanded these channels of trade. Until the end of the fifteenth century the supply of eastern products to Europe was their monopoly.

This, in brief, was the position when Vasco da Gama made his landfall on May 17, 1498, eight miles north of Calicut, which was at the time 'the most important place of trade in the whole of India.' Portugal, today one of the smallest and poorest of European nations, took the initiative in finding a sea route to the east mainly because of one man. Prince Henry the Navigator was a 'scholar and a scientist, a soldier, and a crusader.' Abandoning the splendid life of the mediaeval palace, he set himself the task of studying the art of cartography, of equipping voyages to distant countries. The Portuguese had a fine instrument to hand in the caravel, a sailing ship of about two hundred tons, 'broad of beam and capable of carrying plenty of water and provisions.' Though slow, it was eminently seaworthy.

The school of navigation which Prince Henry established at Sagras in 1416 produced many a notable sea captain and explorer. Sailor, merchant and explorer were animated by Christian zeal to get the better of the Muslim, and the trader had the additional incentive of wanting to get rid of the middleman. Christian Europe vaguely identified these longings with the person of Prester John, who was supposed to be King of Ethiopia.

The Azores, eight hundred miles from their country, was the first oversea station the Portuguese established in their search for a sea route to the east. It was Henry's lifework to find a way around Africa by sea. Though, when he died in 1460, only 'the great bulge of Africa had just been rounded', the way was open for Vasco da Gama. What India could expect became clear at the outset. Along with exploration went trade and piety, and often piracy too. 'For a time what had been a relatively small and insignificant European country dominated the western waters with a chain of ports from Madeira to Cape Verde and beyond.'

Diego Cam, one of the Portuguese mariners who continued Henry's labours, made two voyages along the African coast in 1482–84. He 'sailed more than 1400 miles further than anyone else of his day, and so in a sense he laid the foundations for the final step of rounding the southern end of Africa.' It was finally rounded by Bartholomew Diaz who began a momentous journey in 1487. But he did not realise what he had achieved.

Christopher Columbus' discovery of America was part of the rivalry developing between Portugal and Spain. The Pope, following his famous bull, arranged the treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 by

which Portugal and Spain shared the world between themselves. Da Gama gave Portugal the initial advantage by sailing to India by the southern route.

Da Gama's voyage, made with 180 men in four ships, each of about 120 tons, covered 24,000 miles and spent over three hundred days on the open sea. In one phase of his voyage da Gama was out of sight of land for 96 days. Columbus' journey was of 6,000 miles and lasted eighty days on the open sea. Dias was the pilot of da Gama's fleet.

The daring expedition conferred enormous advantages on Portugal. It transformed the poorest European country of the day into the mistress of the east. The Indian Ocean became a Portuguese lake. On the eastern coast of Africa, along the Persian Gulf and in south-east Asia, the Portuguese set up factories and fortresses, hemming India in, as it were. Some great leaders of men, of daring vision, stupendous energy and considerable statecraft animated the Portuguese century in eastern waters. But religious bigotry undid much of the work. It created numerous enemies in Sri Lanka and India as well as elsewhere. By the time the Dutch, whose country Spain ravaged in an effort to reimpose Catholicism, became a force in the east, the Portuguese had become decrepit and an object of derision.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the Dutch had expelled the Portuguese from Sri Lanka and south India. The Dutch made their first trading voyage to the east in 1598, and with amazing rapidity they displaced the Portuguese in their seats of power and commerce. They were impelled by an almost fierce dedication to their cause. There was also the religious spirit to spur them. The United Company, formed in 1602, was a 'very powerful organism.'

The Dutch concentrated their attention initially on south-east Asia. 'The spice trade of the Moluccas was looked upon as the great prize of the Indian world.' The archipelago became the economic, administrative and strategic centre of the Dutch system. Until Dutch imperialism ended, after the Second World War in the present century, Java was to the Dutch what India was to the British. The Dutch came to India in the first instance only because they found that the pepper and spices they sought in the archipelago were best paid for not in money, as they were doing in the initial stages, but through textiles from the Coromandal coast and Gujarat. In their single-minded devotion to their cause, they resolved to

eliminate Indian and Arab middlemen. Their attempts, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, to set up factories on Indian soil, at Surat and on the Malabar coast, failed. But in 1605 the first Dutch cargo of Indian cotton goods left Masulipatam for Achin and Bantam, the leading Dutch factories in Sumatra and Java respectively. The Dutch settled down at Masulipatam in 1605.

This was followed by another factory at Petapoli, now called Nizamapatnam. But the main centre of Dutch trade and power on the east coast was Pulicat, about forty miles north of Madras, on the southern shore of Lake Pulicat. Pulicat began as an unarmed factory. When the Portuguese destroyed it on June 9, 1612, Wemmer van Berchem, the General Director of the Coromandal coast, fortified it by the next year. The fort was named Geldria, after Berchem's home province. It became a powerful centre influence.

Pulicat developed apace, particularly during the anarchy in the neighbouring areas caused by repeated Muslim invasions. Even before the original settlement was destroyed, it had been described as 'the left arm of the Moluccas and neighbouring islands, since without the cottons from thence trade is dead in the Moluccas.' The Dutch trade consisted in the export of textiles mainly to the archipelago, but also partly to Europe. Rice, vegetables and also slaves were exported to Batavia, now Jakarta. So were diamonds and indigo, the latter grown near Masulipatam. The Dutch bought these articles in exchange for the products they imported. The Indian market did not want much of European goods. Neither the Dutch nor the English could export much money from their homelands. They raised it in countries which paid cash for their exports, principally China and Japan. They also imported from the archipelago the goods which India wanted, mainly spices from Indonesia, sandalwood and pepper from Malaysia, copper from Japan and some kinds of textiles from China.

Under an agreement during a temporary period of amity, in 1621, the English came to Pulicat to share its facilities. By this time the Dutch chief had been made Governor. The English association proved short-lived. Pulicat was to flourish, decay and disappear purely as a Dutch enterprise. Today nothing remains there but a few European tombs. One of these contains a carving of Fort Geldria.

The first English ship to anchor in Indian waters, on August 24, 1608, was the *Hector*, commanded by William Hawkins. It was

part of the third voyage of the East India Company, which had received a charter from Queen Elizabeth I, on December 31, 1600, as 'the Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies' with monopoly of English trade from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan.

The first voyage in 1601–3 and the second in 1604–6 were made not to India, but to Achin in Sumatra, to Bantam in Java and to the Moluccas. By 1608, when the third voyage began, England had concluded peace with Spain and Portugal, which it had been fighting for some time. The English Company had discovered that south-east Asia was not a good market for its manufactures. Captain James Lancaster of the first voyage had sold iron, tin and lead in south-east Asia and bought spices. But his woollen goods found no purchasers. In 1608 the English factors at Bantam wrote to London that there was a big market for Indian calico cloth. A trading centre in India, therefore, became necessary.

It was decided that the third voyage should, on its way to Bantam, explore trade possibilities at Aden and Surat. The English faced much hostility from the Portuguese at Surat, but Jehangir permitted them, in 1608, to build a factory there. However, it was not until four years later that they could do so. Their cause was helped by a resounding naval victory that Captain Best, though heavily outnumbered, gained over the Portuguese off Swally. This was the first blow Portuguese naval supremacy suffered. The Mughals considered naval warfare beneath their dignity and had, in consequence, to put up with Portuguese hectoring at sea. Sailors of another nation were found who could rout those who had hitherto been invincible.

The English merchants were well served by Sir Thomas Roe, the ambassador of King James I to Jehangir. Unlike the Englishmen who had gone to the Mughal court, all of them merchants and therefore held in little regard at that court, Roe was well aware of the dignity of his country and of his own importance. He was not a man, like Hawkins before him, who would complacently accept an Armenian bride Jehangir condescendingly chose for him. Untiring in his work, he was sagacious.

Roe forwarded as best he could the interests not only of the king who had deputed him but also of the Company. He could not obtain the specific contracts he had been asked to secure. A treaty in the modern sense was 'an idea utterly alien to the political system

of the Mughals.' But he doughtily upheld English interests against continued Portuguese intrigue and misrepresentation.

The ambassador suggested that the East India Company capture the Red Sea traffic, sell spices and Indian and English goods for specie in Egypt, use the specie to buy calicoes in India and sell the calicoes in south-east Asia, which grows spices. But this involved the company in acrimonious disputes with the Mughals and with its European rivals. The Dutch were becoming increasingly aggressive in south-east Asia. The massacre of Amboyna, which rankled in English minds for generations, occurred in 1623. Ten Englishmen and nine Japanese were arrested on the charge of attempting to seize the Dutch fort and murder the Governor, tortured and executed with great barbarity. Amboyna marked the virtual expulsion of the English from south-east Asia. They had only India to look to.

When Roe left on his voyage back to England in February, 1619, English factories had been set up at Surat, Agra, Ahmedabad and Broach. On the east coast the English had come to Masulipatam in 1611. Captain Hippon of the *Globe*, a ship belonging to the seventh voyage, had attempted to open up trade at Pulicat, where the Dutch had settled down the previous year. They frustrated his efforts. He then journeyed to Petapoli, landed there and proceeding northwards to Masulipatam, set up a factory in September 1611.

Hippon obtained a 'cowle', a document of authorisation, from the local Governor. Two years later the English secured a grant for a fortified factory 'written on a leaf of gold' from the Hindu authorities in the interior who remained in power. But the Nawab of Golconda gradually established his authority over the coast, and the English had to seek a guarantee from him. His 'Golden Phirmaund', as the English called it, promised them that 'under the shadow of Me, the king, they shall sit down at rest and in safety'. The English, in return, engaged to import Persian horses for him. Horses played an important part in medieval Indian warfare, and the facility to import and sell them was a valuable one which the Portuguese at Goa and other foreigners exploited.

3

Paintings

The Dutch, the most enterprising of the European merchants active in India in the seventeenth century and the first to settle down at Masulipatam, the most important commercial centre on the Coromandal coast, signed an agreement with the Sultan of Golconda in 1606.

Initially Masulipatam trade was in coarse cloth, cotton yarn and indigo. Spices, silk, lead, quicksilver, porcelain and broadcloth were among the commodities added later. But the region's main product was 'painted' cloth, which enjoyed world-wide renown. This cotton cloth which carried elaborate designs was unique of its kind in the century. India was still 'the only country in the world which could dye vegetable fibre (that is, cotton, as distinct from linen) in fast and luminous colours, so that when the fabric was washed, those colours increased rather than diminished in beauty and subtlety. Moreover, such Indian fabrics had the additional advantage of being extremely cheap in terms of contemporary trade values.'

At the end of the century John Ovington, who was then in western India, wrote: 'In some things the Artists of India out-do all the Ingenuity of Europe, viz., in the painting of Chits and Callicoes, which in Europe cannot be parallel'd, either in the brightness and life of the Colours, or in their continuance upon the Cloath.'

'Painted' cloth was made at many centres on the east coast, but Masulipatam cloth was particularly valued for its special properties. Mechanical applications and changes in fashion have robbed this product of much of its value today. However, 'kalamkari', a derivative from the old style, is gaining in popularity. Masu-

lipatam is still the chief centre of production, but with Sri Kalahasti added. Interestingly, red is still the main colour.

'Painting' was the name the Europeans gave to the technique of imparting design and colour to cloth. It was distinct from 'printing'. The latter, which implies the use of some kinds of blocks, produces limited effects. The former, which involves the direct stencilling of design from paper to cloth, suffers no limitations. The artisan could make freehand drawings on cloth by reproduction and use a brush to achieve the full effects. This was an important reason why his textiles were much esteemed.

The best kinds of 'painted' cloth were made at Petapoli, about forty miles south-west of Masulipatam, and at Palacole, about eighty miles to the north. They owed their excellence to a madder, a plant which grew wild at the mouth of the Krishna delta. It was the use of a mordant derived from this madder which made this cloth so much valued, particularly for its red tones. Attempts were made to grow the plant in the Madras region, but the results were not satisfactory.

There are many contemporary European references to the superior qualities of the Masulipatam 'paintings'. William Methwold, who was senior factor at Masulipatam from 1618 to 1622, wrote, 'The paintings of this coast of Coromandal are famous throughout India, and are indeed the most exquisite that are seen, the best wrought of all with the pencil, and with such durable colours that, notwithstanding they be often washed, the colours fade not whilst the cloth lasteth; and this hapneth principally by a plant which growth only in this country (Golconda) called by them chay, which dyeth or stayneth a perfect red, with them in as great account as scarlet with us, and is the King's particular commodity.' When, about ten years later, the Company was considering abandoning its factory at Petapoli, the local factors urged that on no account should it be given up '. . . chiefly for reds, because no other place affords the like colour.'

The Dutch were aware of the secret before the English came to Masulipatam. A document of theirs, dated 1607, states that the 'red paint' (that is, dye) with which the Petapoli cloth was coloured 'could only be found on a little island in the neighbourhood.' About four years later, another Dutch record states that the best dye came from 'the island called Tambreve', opposite Petapoli.

At the end of the seventeenth century Alexander Hamilton

wrote in his *New Account of the East Indies* that the 'chay' was cultivated on an island called Diu and that it was a 'shrub growing in grounds that are overflown with spring-tides. It stains their calicoes in the most beautiful and lively colours in the world.'

This 'chay' would not grow well except near Masulipatam. Towards the end of the seventeenth century the English at Madras attempted to use 'northern chay' on textiles made there. But their workmen resisted the attempts. The President of Fort St. George wrote in 1700, 'I think we far outdo Masulipatam and hope by the next ship to send you a thousand pieces as were never seen in the world, if I can but keep these cursed fellows from mixing the Southern chay with the Northern, the latter being best and costs much more.'

The plant yielded its unique properties on the Andhra coast because the fields were 'overflown with spring tides' and also because there were 'broken or rotten shells' in the sandy soil. The plant throve on the calcium. It failed on the Madras coast where it was grown on dung.

Whole families worked on the textiles. There was considerable division of labour as between one joint family and another. Daniel Havart, whose *Op-en Ondergang von Coromandel* is one of the three Dutch works of travel valuable for the history of these times (the others are Francois Valentyn's *Oud en Nieuw Oost Indien* and Philippus Baldaeus' *Nauwkeurige beshrijvinge van Malabar en Choromandel*) says that there were 'four kinds of painters, who each have according to their family a special name. Between these is divided the demand, and they put out the work again to those of lower rank who do the work.' A big commission like a hanging which was much admired in Europe and Iran would be performed by several joint families. The ordinary textiles too would be shared, though not to the same extent.

Dyeing operations ceased totally during the monsoons. They were carried on only in the 'dry' seasons. It usually took three months to manufacture a hanging. Work proceeded 'very slowly like snails, which creep on and appear not to advance. Yes, he who would wish to depict Patience would need no other object than such painter of Palicol' (Palacole), wrote Havart. Dr John Fryer, the English physician, said that the painting was added 'by little children as well as elder grown, they stretching the piece on the ground and sitting upon them, run them over with a dexterity

and exactness peculiar to themselves.'

The painter was not merely an artisan. He followed the musters, or books of designs, 'after his own manner'. In making hangings he was guided by the musters because, his chief markets being the Mughal empire, Iran and Europe, the fashionable designs were all foreign to him. These musters, however, were not complete designs, only 'incidental and unrelated figure–groups.' He made them a coherent whole with his own individual decorative designs.

In making piecegoods, which were not as elaborate as hangings and did not require so much attention, the fundamental principles were not different.

Though called 'Masulipatam chintz', the cloths were actually made at Petapoli and Palacole. For long Masulipatam was only 'the port or emporium where goods made in the hinterland could be bought or contracted. They were cheaper at Petapoli and Palacole by at least thirty per cent than at Masulipatam.'

The trade was so profitable that about 1620 the Sultan of Golconda ordered that the 'painters should work only' for him and the Iranians. The court was interested in the sea trade with Iran where, a contemporary document says, 'Cheetes or Pinthatoes are much used in the linings of coats and in the making of beds and quilts', and 'fine coloured Pintado table-cloths, 40 ells long at first' were laid over carpets in the houses of the rich. These goods were chiefly exchanged for horses.

The paintings were popular in the Mughal territories too. Even the austere Aurangzeb used them in his tents. Visiting him in 1665, Francois Bernier, the French traveller, found the principal tent lined inside with 'beautiful handpainted chintz, manufactured for the purpose at Masulipatam.' The emperor's main apartment was hung with 'Masulipatam chintz, painted over with flowers of a hundred different kinds.' European residents in India placed large orders for cotton paintings. Colley, an English factor at Petapoli, was asked by Woodson, a colleague at Masulipatam, for a 'chitte to make a quilt' and by another Masulipatam colleague to exchange a writing cabinet for a Petapoli 'chint.' The English company occasionally offered the paintings as gifts in other parts of Asia.

'Masulipatam chintz' was becoming popular in England by 1620. A fashionable home noticed in 1641 contained a 'suite of Hangings Consisting of Four Pieces of Indian Pintadoes and Cur-

taines of the same suite with a Valence thereto, and four little Indian Carpets.' Eight years earlier, Samuel Pepys bought for his wife 'a chint, that is, a painted East Indian callicoe for to line her new study.' Two years later John Evelyn saw in a country house 'a room hung with Pintado, full of figures great and small, prettily representing sundry trades and occupations of the Indians with their habits.'

There was competition between the local Golconda authorities and the European merchants for the services of the painters because, while the products were very popular, the production was small. Tavernier says that 'when one makes requisition of all the workers who manufacture these cotton cloths it is with difficulty that one obtains as much as three bales.'

4
Search for Madras

DAY's search for a settlement to replace Armagon was initially a local decision. The English factors, very unhappy at Masulipatam and thoroughly disillusioned with Armagon, resolved to look for another settlement on their own responsibility. The company at London was in great difficulties at this stage and unable to spend money on anything but trade. The expense of building so uncommercial a structure as a fort was abhorrent to it. As for the Surat presidency, it adopted a noncommittal attitude when the Masulipatam agency pressed it for a decision.

Day, who had been in charge at Armagon since 1634, was convinced that it would not do at all. It signally failed to fulfil the hopes its founding had excited. The roads were shallow and exposed; no cloth was manufactured there, and the merchants had been impoverished by the exactions of the Naik; while the fort itself, in spite of all the repairs carried out, was so dilapidated that further large expenditure was unavoidable.

The English might have founded a settlement on the Nellore coast, more tractable than the one in the Masulipatam area a quarter of a century earlier. In 1614, three years after the abortive attempt to open up trade at Pulicat, they received an invitation from Indian merchants in the region to settle there. The matter was mismanaged. The invitation was renewed a few weeks later with 'a formal grant from the Vijayanagar monarch.' But three months later Sriranga II was killed in prison and the second of the ruinous civil wars of this century afflicted the country. It was decided that it was no suitable time for an important venture like a new settlement.

Five years later, in 1619, another opportunity arose. An agreement reached in London that year to end the fighting between the

English and the Dutch in the east provided that the companies of the two nations should share the eastern trade in certain proportions and jointly meet the cost of protecting their interests against the Portuguese. English factors were to be admitted to the Dutch settlements, including the main one of Batavia, but not those in western India, Iran or the Red Sea region. Neither company liked this agreement. The English set up an agency at Pulicat. But there were frequent quarrels with the Dutch, and they withdrew.

The next event occurred in 1628. Goaded beyond endurance by what they considered oppression at Masulipatam, the English removed to Armagon, now called Durgarayapatnam, on the northern shore of Lake Pulicat. There, for the first time in India, they were allowed to fortify a settlement. But they found the conditions miserable. The local Naik, much under the influence of the Dutch at Pulicat, only thirty-five miles to the south, placed many obstacles in their way. The fort was of little value as a place of security. When in 1632 the Masulipatam officials promised the English better treatment, they returned. The settlement at Armagon was retained, a few factors being stationed there. The fort was rebuilt in 1634, but it was still a poor one.

The English continued to be unhappy at Masulipatam and they were looking for other settlements. At the end of January 1637 the Pulicat Dutch wrote to Batavia that an English merchant named Francis Day had recently sailed past from Masulipatam to 'Pollocheere', or Pondicherry, to negotiate the building of a settlement there. They also reported a rumour that the English intended to build a fort either at Pondicherry or at 'Conimeer', or Kunimedu, thirteen miles north of Pondicherry. Neither attempt came to anything. The English records, sparse at this time, do not refer to them.

The English then considered Covelong, about ten miles north of Mamallapuram. In November, 1637, Pedro de Silva, the Portuguese Viceroy at Goa, complained to Methwold, the English President at Surat, that according to information received from the east coast the English were attempting to found a factory at 'Covalao' and that they were disturbing the good relations the Portuguese had long enjoyed with the local rulers. The Viceroy had in the previous month written to the King of Portugal that he had ordered the Portuguese settlements not to trade with the English, but to

avoid an open rupture with them. He had added that he had received news of an English attempt to found a factory at a port named 'Covalao', which was two leagues, about seventeen miles, south of Santhome, for which object they had received the local ruler's permission. He had instructed the Captain-General of Meliapore, or Mylapore, to use every possible means to prevent the English from going to Covelong.

There was no need for any Portuguese anxiety on this score. In a letter dated May 17, 1638 Masulipatam told Surat that nothing more than 'words . . . . passed betwixt that Governor and our people. Tis true faire profers were made unto us. As for the breach of peace the Portuguese Viceroy had alleged following our intendments to take Coulas, it was unknowne to any of us heere whether such a matter might prove prejudicial to the peace.'

Meanwhile, conditions deteriorated in the English Masulipatam agency. There was much indiscipline among the factors. One of them, Richard Hudson, complained that the house was 'altogether a monster (or a boddy without a head), each was his own director.' Captain Weddell, the commander of a ship belonging to the Curtenian Association, an organisation rival to the East India Company, fired into the town and killed some people, thus creating a grave situation. Day and a few other factors were accused of forwarding Weddell's interests. There was no money even to maintain the house. Finally, there was an acrimonious dispute over the Agentship. Bantam, in whose jurisdiction Masulipatam was at this time, appointed Thomas Ivy to succeed Thomas Clarke. But London sent out Andrew Cogan to fill the same office.

It was when Ivy was on his way from Java to Masulipatam that the first steps towards what came to be the final solution were taken. Ivy passed through Armagon in July, 1639. Day, the local chief, whose determined endeavour to remove from Armagon was now becoming evident, secured his permission to meet the Naik of Poonamallee to discuss the founding of a new settlement to the south.

This proposal is first mentioned by Day in a letter he wrote to Masulipatam on August 27, 1639, a document of capital importance. Madras is introduced to history a little abruptly. Day pours out a tale of woe regarding obnoxious Armagon. He has no money to pay off debts or even to meet the current expenses of the house and the garrison. He cannot borrow larger amounts because that is

forbidden by the company. In any case, the poverty of the place being such that 'at present I know not where to take up 10 pagodas', he is in dire straits. He is only buoyed up by the hope of 'an intended removal from this unprofitable place.'

Then comes the reference to Madraspatam. 'Att your being here I acquainted you with many kind invitations and large priviledges by the Nague of (sic) Vincatadra, whose teritories lyes between Pullacatt and Santomee, the only place for paintings, soe much desired at southwards (that is, Bantam) and likewise great store of longcloath and morrees which is there procurable. (Muster of the later now accompanyes these).'

This is also the first reference to Naik Venkatapathi. Unlike the Naik of Armagon, who was under the thumb of the Dutch, the Naik of Wandiwash was a magnate of the Vijayanagar empire. The English seem to have known little of him except that he was 'Lord General of Carnatica and Grand Visier to the emperor.' But the Dutch add a few material particulars. He had an army of about 15,000 soldiers. His headquarters were at Wandiwash, but he lived most of the time at the capital, Chandragiri, placing his younger brother, Damarla Ayappa, in charge of his district, its headquarters being Poonamallee. In fact, Venkatapathi was the most important person in the empire after the emperor, Venkata III, who was his brother-in-law.

Day adds in his letter, 'I had your Consent to make a Voyage to the Nague, and therefore sett sayle for those parts the 23th Jully, and arived the 27th, where I was entertayned with much honnour by the Nague, himself etc., Me(r)chants, Painters and Weavers. After some parlay with the Nague, I had free leve to viz(i)t his townes and soe discourse with the Merchants, Painters and Weavers, whoe brought mee musters of all their sorts of Cloath'.

Keeping in mind the fact that Day was determined to present the situation in the best possible colours, what he concludes from a study of the prices is inevitable. 'Having Compared boath sorts and prizes with ours at Armagon, beleve mee, I lament our masters great Losses and Cannot blame our friends at Southwards for their offten Complaints. The Dutch may well undersell us when wee over(pay) by them 20, 30 and in some sorts 40 per cent. It is a misserie to know a grevance, if possabillityes for remedies bee wanting.'

Perhaps recalling in his mind the discussions in the Masuli-

patam agency regarding the many earlier attempts at new settlements, Day adds, 'You must pardon mee if I say that it hath been usuall in such kinds to make to many Doubts when faire opertunityes for our Masters Beniffitt offerd it selfe. I neede not tell you that Armagon is only Chargable; the place affords nothing of itselfe, not soe much as a peece of whit Cloath but Comes from other places. As for merchants, how misserable poore they are, by the Nagues continuall forceings, there complying with us and the cloath sent to the southwards speakes loude in confirmation of the misserey of the place, with their backward perfformances'.

Day proceeds with energetic eloquence: 'The Common Arbitrator, time, hath now made a beneficiall discovery, iff you shall please to imbrace such large and secure offers. . . . it may give incouragement sufficient . . . . Oppertunity of time is to bee followed when such occasions for our masters benifite offers itselfe. Changes of time are tickle and, if you suffer this oppertunitye to pass over, you shall perhaps in vaine afterwards pursue the same when it is fledd and gone. Our envighous neighbours, the Dutch, I dout not but wilbeestirr themselves to their power in hindering of us what lyes in them; yett lett not that discourage you, for all their Machivillian Pollicyes will not prevaile. If it should, the Company can bee noe loaser, for they runn noe hazard. If you will not follow this course, you quite forgoe the way which promiseth asurance, leaveing firme securitye mearely to chance and hazard.'

Confident that the 'inclosed coppie of the firman granted by the Nague will demonstrate' that his offers are 'large and secure', Day undertakes, as an earnest of his firm belief in what he is saying, 'not to lay clayme to any one penny of what shall be due to mee for all my service from my honourable imployers' if the goods available near Madraspatam 'shall not apeare at the southwards 15 per cent cheaper then those formerly bought at Armagon.' Did he not place the interests of his employers above his own, 'I would never soe willingly hazard. But why doe I say hazard, being confident I run none, having so good asurance off performance.'

The historic 'firman', really a 'cowle', as it should have been called, which forms the legal basis for the foundation of Madras, Day enclosed with his letter. There are three contemporary versions of the grant. Titled 'The firman granted Mr Day for privileges in Madraspatam by the Nague Damela Vintutedra', it appears to have been drafted by Day himself. The copy from which extracts are

given below is in Cogan's handwriting and seems to have been forwarded to Bantam. Of the two other copies one was endorsed by Cogan, and the other he used in his defence when later called to account in England for building Fort St. George. Only one of three copies, or versions, bears a date, July 22, 1639, and that is an error. The correct month was August. The same error is committed in the dating of Day's covering letter.

The 'firman' begins, as it were, by identifying itself, 'having been granted by Domela Vintatedro Nague unto Mr. Frances Day, cheife for the English at Armagon, in behalf of the Honorable Company, for their trading and fortifieing at Madraspatam.' It proceeds: 'Whereas Mr. Francis Day, Captain of the English at Armagon, upon great hopes by reason of our promises offten made unto him hath repaired to our port of Medraspatam and had personall conference with us in behalfe of the Company of that nation, concerning their trading in our territories and friendly commerce with our subjects, we out of our spetiall love and favour to the English, doe grant unto the said Captain, or whomsoever shall bee deputed to idgitate the affairs of that Company by vertue of this firman, power to direct and order the building of a fort and castle in or about Medraspatam, as they shall thinke most convenient; the charges whereof, untill fully and wholly finished, to be defrayed by us, but then to bee repaied when the said English shall first make their enterance to take possession thereof.'

This English translation of the Naik's original contains some unjustified elaborations. Damarla Venkata or his brother, whoever it was that really talked with Day, would not have used the equivalent of the expression, 'castle'. Later, when Cogan and Day arrived in Madras expecting the Naik to begin building the fort, they discovered that he had no such intention. The 'lingual', or the interpreter, had misled Day. This fact suggests that Day might also have misunderstood 'our promises offten made unto him'. Confirmation from quarters other than English is needed for the statement that the Naik had made repeated offers to Day to settle on the coast south of Armagon.

The grant offers four privileges. First, 'to make more full expression of our effection to the English nation (wee) doe confirme unto the said Mr. Francis Day, or whatsoever other substitutes or agents for that Company, full power and authority to governe and dispose of the government of Madraspatam for the terme and space

of two yeares next insueing affter they shall be seated there and possesst of the said fortifications; and for the future by an equall division to receive halfe the custom and revenewes of that port. Moreover, whatsoever goods or merchandize the English Company shall either import or export, forasmuch as concernes the dutyes and customes of Medraspatam (they) shall, not only for the prementioned two yeares in which they injoy the government but for ever after, be custom free. Yett if they shall transport or bring any commoddities up, into or through my countray, then shall they pay halfe the duties that other merchants pay, whether they buy or sell the said commodities either in my dominions or in those of any other Nague whatsoever.'

The second privilege, quite extraordinary to modern notions, was that the 'said English company shall perpetually injoy the priviledges of mintag, without paying any deives or dutyes whatsoever, more than the ordinary wages or hire unto those that shall quoyne the moneyes'.

Thirdly, 'iff the English first accquaint us before they deliver out any moneys to the merchants, painters, weavers, etc., which are or shall hereafter reside in our prementioned port or teritories, and take our word for their sufficcency and honest dealeing then doe wee promise, in case those people faile in their performances, to make good to the English all such sumes of money as shall remaine upon their accounts, or else deliver them their persons, if they shalbe found in any part of my teritories. That whatsoever provision the English shall buy in my country, either for their fort or ships, they shall not be liable to pay any custom or duties for the same.'

Finally, 'if any ships or vessell belonging to the English (or to any other country whatsoever which tradeth at that port) shall by misadventure suffer shippwrack and be driven upon any part of my teritories they shall have restitution upon demand of whatsoever can be found remaining of the said wrack.'

These are generous terms, as Day and Masulipatam recognised and the Surat presidency even suspected. The Masulipatam agency wrote to London on October 25, 1639 that the Naik himself explained his 'fayre privileges' or 'fayre profers'. First, 'he desires his Countray may flurrish and grow rich; which he Conceives it will, by Drawing Merchants to him. Secondly, he desires, for his money good Horses from Persia. Thirdly that yearly upon our ships he may send a servant into the Bay Bengalla, to buy him Hawks,

Apes, Parratts, and such like bables; and that, when he shall have occasion to send a vessell of his own there, or to Persia, a man of ours may proceed upon her. And, lastly the fort, being made substantially and strong, may be able to defend his person on occasion against his insultinge Neighbours.'

Significantly the Naik does not think it expedient to add the reason for which, according to his brother, Ankabhupala in his poem, *Ushaparinayam*, he had founded Chennapatnam, not very many years before, that the Dutch of Pulicat and the Portuguese of Santhome were frequently fighting with each other. In fact, the rise of Chennapatnam did not prevent any further fighting. It played no role at all in history until in a short time it became amalgamated with Madraspatam and Fort St. George to form the city of Madras.

If the Naik had his own reasons for making his generous offers, the Masulipatam agency too was actuated by self-interest in pressing its masters for a favourable decision. It commits some palpable exaggerations in its account of the advantages that would accrue. First, 'off the high plot of ground adjoyning to the sea on which the Naik proffers to build a fort, in what manner we please a ship of any Burthen may Ride within Musket shot.' In fact, Madras harbour has been created in the teeth of nature. Secondly, the river close by 'is capeable of a vessell of 50 Tonnes'. This statement made of the humble Cooum must excite laughter. The truth was that the factors were as tired of Armagon as Day was and grasped at any opportunity to leave it. 'If your Worships intend to continue this trade, as we are confident you will (for without this, your pepper trade is of small vallue especially where you shall buy all for reddy moneys) the abovesaid proffers are not to be refused. For your fort of Armagon is of no value—indeed better left than keept, for tis but a mere Charge to keep it; nay yf it bee kept till next yeare, will require as much Charge as will build another in the prementioned place; besides, it affords at present not a peace of good cloth, for that Nague so pills and pols the Merchants they they are not able to comply with their contracts. Further, this place of Messulapatam is not fit to be your cheif factory, for soe longer as is so in some measure wee must bee subject to these people; for who knowes what may happen tomorrow? Your Estate here, upon alteration of government, is not secure.'

Then follows a very valid argument, based on Dutch practice,

'Why shall not wee in some things Imtimate (imitate) our Invetterate and most Mallitious enemies, which is, assoone as any goods is bought in their private factories (they) send for it in their small Vessels to their fort at Pullacatt; by which means they keep these people soe much the more in subjection, and still Command their owne; the like may wee do if your Worships conceive it fitting; to which we reffer ourselves.'

The factors also try the effects of envious emulation. Saying that the Dutch 'by their large bribes may (when wee would) cause some stop', they report that they had spread a rumour that 'wee were soe farr in debt as wee were scaree able to keep house, and therefore wished the Merchants etc. not to believe as any such thing as building a fort was intended.' The Dutch were not content with spreading rumours. When Damarla Ayappa visited Pulicat about this time, they attempted to make him prevent the rise of the English settlement. Their 'Dagh Register' alleges that, accepting a present they offered him, he promised to act as they wished, but did not keep his promise. If he did make this promise, he could not have been serious, for it was he who was instrumental in the English coming to Madras.

The Portuguese too tried their hand. The Captain-General of Santhome, under orders from the Viceroy at Goa, made 'proffer of any place in that Citty.' Their intention was-rather then wee should settle att Madraspatam, they would afford us any accommodation in St. Thomay, where wee might be under their Command.' This suspicion was justified, for the Portuguese had attempted to prevent the English from settling down at Covelong.

But it was neither the Dutch nor the Portuguese who could have prevented the founding of Madras. Paradoxically, it was the English themselves in the form of the East India Company who could have done so. To understand this it is necessary to realise the straits the company was in at this time.

5
Wranglings

With the hindsight of history it is customary to accuse the East India Company of blindness in objecting to the building of Fort St. George. But the company had very good reasons. Its very existence was in jeopardy and a fort was the last luxury it could afford.

Its difficulties were complex. At the start was the massacre of Amboyna on February 27, 1623. Even the pusillanimous James I was stirred to threaten action against the Dutch, but he died soon after. Charles I was soon involved in his great stuggle with Parliament, and he could do nothing effective.

In south-east Asia the English lost station after station to the Dutch. The company, unable to prosecute any regular system of trade, was obliged to rest satisfied with shifting expedients, sometimes successful, but oftener only productive of disappointment. Its stock, in consequence, instead of commanding a premium, could with considerable difficulty be sold at a discount.

The company compounded its difficulties by an indiscretion. Despairing of obtaining redress in regard to the Dutch question through the crown, it submitted a memorial to Parliament, the crown's antagonists, in 1628, the year the celebrated Petition of Rights was presented. This was a challenge to royal authority. In 1635 the offended king struck. The company was 'startled by the information that King Charles had granted licence to a new body of mercantile adventurers, later known as 'Courteen's Association' after Sir William Courteen, a wealthy London merchant who took the main part in the new company. The king justified his action by strong criticism of the old company.

The king said, 'In all this time, since the erection of the said

East India Company, notwithstanding the manifold privileges granted to them, they had neither so settled and planted trade in those parts, nor made any such fortification, or place of surety, as might give assurance or encouragement to any, in future times, to adventure to trade there; neither had we received any annual benefit from thence (as other princes did), by reason of the said Company's neglect in fortifying'. They had 'merely intended and pursued their own present profit and advantage, without providing any safety or settledness for establishing of traffick in the said Indies for the good of posterity, or for longer time than it should please the natives or inhabitants there to permit the continuance thereof.'

In contrast, the Dutch and the Portuguese had 'planted and fortified themselves there, and established a lasting and hopeful trade there, for the good of posterity; and by advantage thereof had not only rendered our subjects abiding in those parts subject to their insolencies and apparent injuries, but, in a manner, wrought them out of trade there, which we found, not only by the complaint of divers of adventurers in that society, but principally by the daily decrease of our customs for goods imported from thence, which we could impute to nothing more than the said Company's supine neglect of discovery and settling of trade in those parts where they had a plentiful stock, and fair opportunities to have compassed and affected it.'

The king's action was illegal, for the old company was entitled to notice of three years. But he could not afford to be conscientious. He was now trying to rule without Parliament and so could not levy taxes legally. He snatched at any means of securing money. It is likely that Courteen obtained the royal licence in return either for the writing of off debts the king owed him or for a new loan. Moreover, the king was personally interested in the success of the new company. Its first voyage was partly made 'at and by the charge and adventure of us, and of our trusty and faithful servant, Endymion Porter Esq., one of the grooms of our bedchamber.'

The old company submitted a remonstrance to the king. It was only partially successful. A royal proclamation said that the new company could only trade to 'such of those parts and places before named, where the said East India Company had not settled factories and trade before the 12th December, 1635'. On the other hand, the permission to 'Courteen's Association', originally granted

only for a single voyage, was now extended to five years. The new royal order was to supersede 'any charters, letters-patents, grants of incorporations, or of any liberties, powers, jurisdictions, privileges of trade or traffick, or any act of parliament, statute, ordinance, proclamation, provision or restriction, or other matter or thing whatsoever, to the contrary hereof, in any wise notwithstanding'.

To the old company's mortification, the first voyage of the new company was a great success. While the former's presidency at Surat was suffering from a recent famine and from Shahjehan's imprisonment of the leading merchants in the town in retaliation for a pirate under English colours plundering a ship bearing his flag, the Courteen ships returned with a great profit. The old company wrote mournfully to Surat, 'Wee could wish that wee could vindicate the reputacion of our nation in these parts, and do ourselves right for the losse and damage our estate in those partes have susteyned; but of all these wee must beare the burthen, and with patience sitt still, untill we may find these frowning tymes more auspicious to us and to our affayres.'

The company endured the 'frowning tymes' for a number of years. It submitted innumerable petitions to the government, imploring to be saved from ruin. At last the Privy Council recommended that the licence to the Courteen company be withdrawn provided a new joint stock was formed. But the attempt to do this failed, for the times were bad, a civil war appearing imminent. It broke out in 1642, when Fort St. George was in the third year of its career. The joint stock having failed to materialise, the old company returned to its depressed condition. It was at this disastrous stage that its factors, far away in India, blithely proposed to build a fort at an expense it could not afford.

The company was virtually prostrate during the civil war. It is, therefore, easy to see why it should have been annoyed with Cogan and Day for building the fort. Either ignorant of the menacing situation in England or unable to comprehend its effects on their future, the factors, six thousand miles away, proceeded with their plans. Day himself took the letter and Naik Venkatapathi's 'firman' to Masulipatam, evidently to argue the case personally. But the English agency was in the throes of a dispute. It is necessary to refer to it at some length because it throws light on what manner of man Cogan was and it illustrates the factious relations among the English factors, which broke out at Madras in the Foxcroft dispute in the

same century and more notably in the Pigot affair in the eighteenth.

Cogan had just superseded Thomas Ivy as Agent at Masulipatam when Day appeared there. But the supersession had not come about without a struggle. Cogan had travelled from Surat overland through Goa and Golconda and arrived at Masulipatam on August 11, 1639. He had found Ivy installed as Agent. Bantam had appointed Ivy as Agent and Cogan only as Second Member of the Council.

The first shot in the campaign was fired when Cogan, writing from near Golconda to Masulipatam on August 9, asserted, 'You tell me what power the President of Bantam hath conferr'd upon the Agent, by vertue of which (never remembering that clause in your commission which tells (you) must subscribe to the Companies order) you lay one me your perimitorie comands: which Ile obey as is fitting, but good maners would have taught you more modestie, knowing my imployment from the Company is noe way inferriour to any yours.'

The dispute would not have gathered to a head had the disputants known that the President of Bantam had written to the President of Surat on August 16 clearly accepting Cogan as Agent at Masulipatam, 'Ere we understood of your determinations in sending Mr Andrew Cogham for Coromandel we dispeeded the Eagle thither, and upon her sent Mr Thomas Ivy to take charge of our masters estate and set in order there most distracted business in those parts. But since the receipt of those afforesaid advises (letters from Surat dated April 9 and May 10) we have revoked what then we imposed upon Mr Ivy and by conveighance of the Daines sent absolute commission for seatinge Mr Cogan in that Agency.'

Ignorant of this order, Cogan and Ivy wrangled at Masulipatam. Ivy insisted on what he considered his rights. For the time being, Cogan contented himself with a protest. He communicated a note to Ivy and the other factors on August 19 stating that he was anxious that the dispute should not harm the company's interests. The London company had, on March 16, 1638, issued an order that he was to be Agent at Masulipatam. The next day it had written a private letter to Surat to the same effect. These clear instructions ought to be obeyed. But even if they were not, 'I will not make anie commotion, for I so little value my own content that for the good of the Company I'll be a second Curtious.'

But Cogan qualified this self-denial with a recital of his valuable services to the company. He had given up his post at Surat and,

to promote the company's interests, had made a dangerous journey to Masulipatam. 'I may not omit to let you know that at Golconda the King received me as a man sent immediately from the company to manage their affairs in these parts; who upon my petition granted me (and in my name) his roiall firman for the better and quieter negotiating their business.'

Cogan makes play with the likely royal anger if a man so warmly received at Golconda should be slighted at Masulipatam. 'When which king shall understand you refuse to obey the companies comand, is likely hee may withdraw what soe lately hath cost the company a round some of mony (and for which the Dutch would give thowsands) for he will conceive you to be reffractorie people or me an imposter; but he is (and shall be) so well possesst of the truth of both that without all peradventure heele beleeive himself to be abused; which pray take into your consideration, for Kings must not bee dallied withall. Perchance some may saie (as I have alreadi heard) 'Lett the King doe what he dare, weele right ourselves by sea'; which how prejudicial it may bee to the company, when if wee will wee may trade or traffique all his kingdome over, paying no customs or other duties, I leave to the judgements of our betters.' Finally, if he were of 'turbulent spirit', all of them put together should not deprive him of his rights. As it is, he will make no disturbance.

Promptly, on the same day, Ivy replied to this missive. He insisted that an Agent nominated by Bantam could not be superseded on the strength of the company's letters Cogan had cited. In fact, the company itself had in letters written to Bantam at the same time wished Gerald Pinson to remain on the coast. 'Ergo, Mr Andrew Cogan was never intended their Agent, but to supplie this Agencie as a prime man in any of their subordinate factories.' It had also, in later letters to Bantam, spoken of Pinson as Agent and had not mentioned Cogan. As for Cogan's exploits at Golconda, they were not more than what a good servant should have performed, and no doubt he would be adequately rewarded for them. He, Ivy, intended to assert his rights, but he would leave it to Bantam to settle the dispute.

Cogan waited for about a fortnight. On September 2, remarking that the agency had not replied to his letter of August 19, except a message from Ivy declining to give up the post, he said that, if the agency supported Ivy, he would remain quiet until Bantam sent its

decision. But he must have its declaration on the question.

The agency did not reply, but Ivy did, on the same day. He invited Cogan to consider the fact that their dispute had badly affected the company's affairs in Masulipatam. 'If so bee you have ought else to show for the displacing of mee then what you have done, produce it under foure of the Council hands, and accordingly I shall proceed.' (The four members were Day, Peniston, Morris and Winter.) Ivy has been suffering from a violent fever for nine days and would have been glad to be free of these troubles.

On the same day Ivy complained to Bantam that he had been replaced as Agent by Cogan by a combination of delinquents. He had accepted the situation because he was ill and he wished to avoid disturbances. But Bantam should consider that, if it allowed its orders to be slighted, it could not expect any more government in the service. He was sailing to Bantam and would personally explain the state of affairs at Masulipatam.

It would appear that the Masulipatam factors had held a consultation on the receipt of Cogan's letter on September 2. The next day they wrote to Ivy delivering their opinion. It was true that Ivy held a commission from Bantam, 'but it hath a refference of submission to any order from Europe.' As Cogan had 'a powerfull right' 'by virtue of an 'immediate order from the Honourable company' the factors 'think and shall so take him to bee the man to whom you must submit unto.' Cogan had been allowed a salary never, or very seldom, paid to subordinates in these parts. Further, the grants Cogan had obtained at Golconda might be recalled if he was not made Agent. Therefore, the factors had decided to recognise Cogan.

The factors who reached this decision were Day, Peniston, Winter, Rogers, Greenhill, Tompkins and Morley. Thomas Morris, the youngest in Council but one, remained neutral in the dispute. There had been some 'private discontent' between him and Ivy who in consequence attempted to displace him in the Council. Therefore, Morris did not wish to act against Ivy lest he be accused of being revengeful. 'Moreover, all the property of the company is in his hands except the plate and furniture in the Agent's chamber .... For which cause it may be the Worshipful Thomas Ivy wilbe contentious and trouble me; therefore I beseech you deside the difference betwene yourselves.'

Still on the same day, September 3, Cogan, established as

Agent, reported to Bantam, that, when he arrived at Masulipatam from Golconda, he expected to be accepted as Agent in accordance with the company's order, but he was disappointed. For, when Ivy returned from 'Malloule,' or Mallavol (a place near Masulipatam, which the English had leased) 'he commands me not to disturbe him in his empire.' Cogan found Ivy's commission very ample, but still 'with refference to the companies order.' It was in defiance of this order that the then President and Council at Bantam had appointed Cogan second to 'prowd Mr Ivie.' In the dispute that followed Ivy 'profest rather to forgoe his life then place.' Cogan waited quietly for some time but raised the issue again on September 2, 'when all that were appointed for Councell to the Agent from Bantam were together.' 'Whereupon after mature deliberation, they, the Councell and all other the companies servants (conferred the post) upon mee.'

Ivy did not give up the fight. The next day, September 4, he delivered a protest in the presence of Thomas Morris, Roger Wright, George Sephton and Edward Hemingway. He had been displaced by 'some forged and windy reasons.' By their action Cogan and 'this knott of combination, which shall bee unknit in due time,' had insulted the Bantam presidency, disgraced the English in the eyes of the local people, and allowed the Dutch to rejoice at their folly. Reminding the cabal that there had been a change of Presidents at Bantam, Ivy was certain, on the basis of letters from London stating that Read and Cartwright were coming out, that a new Agent would be appointed shortly. On this he was willing to stake his property.

Ivy attended a consultation held on September 5 when a decision important for the history of Madras was taken, that Day should sail to Madras so as to induce the Naik of Poonamallee to wait for the company's decision longer than the forty days he had prescribed. On September 16, Ivy received a reply to his protest. He had been displaced under the company's orders. As for his prognostication regarding a new Agency, they were prepared to hazard an equal sum against Ivy's property, 'the loasers to bee distributed amongst the pore.'

There are references to this dispute in the documents of a later date, but the matter really ended here. Cogan was firmly established as Agent. Later in his life he became a baronet and a man of property. His social position carried considerable weight in that age,

and Ivy had no chance of prevailing against him, however 'proud' he might have been.

Since Cogan's successes at the Golconda court on behalf of the company were one of the reasons why the Masulipatam factors accepted his claim to be Agent, it is necessary to explain what they were. Surat wrote to the company in January 1639, that Cogan and John Wylde, another member of the local council, were being sent to Goa to help in the recovery of some money and in the disposal of a ship, the *Blessing*. This sea voyage was a perilous one, Cogan's ship having been chased by 'some Malabars' for 14 hours. At Goa Cogan entered into a contract with the Viceroy to send two ships to China. Cogan, accompanied by a few others, then began his overland journey to Masulipatam visiting Bijapur and Golconda on the way. He describes it in a letter from Masulipatam on September 3, 1639, to Bantam.

The Bijapur country was full of soldiers 'in so much as I daily feared the cutting of mine and my peoples throat for that which was impossible for me to hide from them although for the monies (that so it might not be discovered) I put in the cane of my pallankeene and the rest under my bed; which, in regard of its waightiness, made me travaile many a mile afoote to ease the poor man which carried me. In all the waie from Goa to Vizapoor the skies were our cannopies and no want of rain, violent winds, and other inconveniences which commonly such a journey at that time of the year, especially when (as before) the country is full of soldiers; for nightly I lay amongst them and three days and nights between two great armies, but (blessed be god) received no other prejudize from them then the expense of all my good liquor and some ten pagodas.'

Cogan's letter says nothing of what he did at Bijapur expect that, on procuring permission to leave it, he bought a tent and 'fowre camills. On the way of Golconda, being given to understand of many theeves were lurkeing near therabouts, for my better security I took up my lodging within a town amongst the theeves.' There was an adventure here: 'The gates were shut upon me. Perceiving this and also that many villians were gathering themselves together about me, I got forth my pallankeene and presented my muskett to those that opposed my going forth.' He ordered his servants to break open the locks of the gates 'and my carriage to proceed. The whole town had armed themselves and made after me.' It would certainly have gone hard with the Englishmen but

that 'it pleased God in the verie instant came in sight a gentleman, servant to the King and my acquaintance, who caused them after some words and a little money to retire.'

Cogan arrived at Golconda on July 22. He hoped to obtain from the Sultan a renewal of the Company's privileges and also orders to the provincial governors to aid the factors in recovering their debts. He succeeded beyond his expectations mainly because of help from 'my noble friend, Meir Mahmud Side, the Sirkele.' This was the general later celebratedly known as Mir Jumla, whose defection to the Mughals brought about Golconda's fall in 1687. Cogan had an audience of the Sultan, 'upwards of an howres discourse,' as he calls it. The Sultan had some complaints to make against the company. 'Our people in Masulipatam had abused both him and my masters; him in killing his subjects (meaning the accompt of Captain Weddall) and the company in not observing of the tennour of his royal fermane which by fathering strangers goods was made voyde.'

Nevertheless, the Sultan gave orders immediately for the drawing up of a general firman 'for our free trade in all parts of his kingdom and three other particular firmans to such governors as I mentioned who and in whose governments were many people indebted to the company.' Majesty was even more kind. It was pleased to use these words, 'That in the respect of the good opinion (he) had of me if any thing else might be beneficiall to the company which was not inserted in my pet(it)ion, I should acquaint his Sirkala with it; who (to the admiration of all people that knows him) used me with that respect as I am not able to express; for all the nobilities waighted on him, and he too (sic) the King and at other times attend on me.'

There were two firmans which Cogan, against all probability, secured from the Sultan. One preserved in Cogan's handwriting is endorsed, 'The King of Golconda his general fermand.' The other, a shorter one, is called 'King of Golconda fermond to particular places.'

Both commence with the statutory preamble, 'Soe far as the sunne exceeds all smaller lights, so glorious am I above other Kings; to whome all Kings are united in freindships; a King not subject to fortune; from the beginnings great and hitherto continued.' The first, addressed to all 'Governours, Substitutes, Officers, Freeholders or else whome it may concerne in these our roiallties and

dominions' states that 'they are to know that the glory of a King consists in the welfaire of his subjects, and their welfare and benefitt imediatly (under God) accrews by comerse; to which purpose we in our roiall favor have granted all nations free egresse to our ports and dominions, that they may pray for the life of our Roiall Majestie', and adds that the Sultan has given him leave to depart 'my royall court, with free leave and full power to negotiate his designes, what money, treasure, or goods, or what else he shall deliver to weavers, pai(nters) or any other, that his worke bee puntually performed and debts cleared; and further the Governours, or by what other name call'd, they shall not only suffer (him in) quiett, but alsoe doe their best to asist him, suffering neither goods nor mony to bee remaines without his especiall leave; and that neither goods, persons, or sergants be detained upon any pretence, but in all passages you rather helpe them.'

The shorter 'firman', addressed to officials in 'our royallties of Ellore, Mahamudshanagar (allias Rajemahandre)' directs them, 'upon paine of our royall indignacion, that whatsoever title or name their goods be of, you pretend no juncknans imposts, customes or duties neither to them servants nor goods; but rather intreate them freindly.'

Cogan's chagrin on arriving at Masulipatam and finding that Ivy was installed as Agent must have been the greater, coming as it did in the wake of his successes at Golconda. Time and again he insists that he had achieved something quite remarkable.

But it may be doubted whether Golconda was being anything more than polite. The English continued to complain of oppression by the local officials. Moreover, the Sultan himself descended on Masulipatam soon afterwards. His coming was 'purposely for presents,' the English agency at Masulipatam wrote to colleagues in Iran. It was said that he expected to receive in all 600,000 pagodas from the foreign traders and his subjects. But 'wee veryly beleeve he scarce got the half.' While the Dutch, the men in esteem, gave him rubies and promised him 'an eliphant and five Persian horses,' and received 'new firmandes, their ould being out of date, to trade freely in all his domonions and onely payeing 3,000 pagodas per annum,' the English cut a sorry figure. 'Wee for our partes could present him with nothing, haveing neither moneys, goodes, nor credite (as before); which by letters and ellse wee posest the King withall. Indeede he sawe with his eyes wee spake and

writt trueth to the shame of our nation, whoe he thought (as he sayed) drove a trade for many milliones of pagodas.' Does this last sentence explain the Sultan's complaisance towards Cogan at Golconda?

It is instructive, as a commentary on the way foreign merchants were treated in the kingdom, to quote from the letter on what followed. 'After hee had been in towne two dayes, wee were commanded out of our howse to a gardaine some two myles from the towne and to leave all our chistes open to vew, under pretence to buy som toyes. In our ould rotton house he and som 100 of his woemen spent som four or six howres to vew and revew what wee had, which in totall wee could not vallew to 2,000 pagodas; for wee were injoyned to leave a price upon all our goodes whattever. The like was done by the Dutch and Danes; and in fine, to make us the more rediculous, wee were peremtorylie commanded to send our good(es) into the marquitt for salle, but noe mankind with them; and women wee had none. In conclusion, after three dayes our goodes were retorned againe, and not anythinge sould of the companies, which was onely 10 cande(es) sandell (and) 15 tubbs china.'

The Sultan had not done with the English. The Dutch gifts and the rewards they gained were 'putt often into our dish by severall Persians nere the King.... Wee were tould plainely wee must either give or promise, but moneys he would none (that is, have) upon any tearmes.' The factors were obliged to promise to present him with 'some rarities to the amount of 3,000 pagodas' when their ships arrived from Surat and England.

6

In Madras

It might be thought that Cogan, who attached considerable importance to the firman on the company's trade at Masulipatam which he had obtained at Golconda, would not favour a new settlement. But it is possible that the Sultan's visit to Masulipatam and the other events that followed made him realise the necessity for it. Moreover, when Cogan was at Surat, he had suggested to a leading member of the company, probably Sir Hugh Hammersly, his father-in-law, that it should order 'the makeings good a place for the securitie of there estate in India; which how much the prejudis the want hath ben is very visible, for are wee not continually subject and have not your estates made good all demaunds from tyme to tyme, be it right or wronge. And. . . . are wee sertayne of continuall peace with the Portugalls and Dutch. Noe, for the peace wee injoy by them is but for theire own ends.'

Whatever the reason, Cogan approved Day's proposals. But there were difficulties in implementing them. Bantam had ordered Masulipatam not to set up any new settlement without its prior permission. Further, the necessary money could not be found. The Naik of Poonamallee had demanded the company's reply to his offer within forty days. It would not be possible to send it in time.

At a consultation held at Masulipatam on September 5, 1639, it was resolved that Day should return to Madraspatam 'with horses, sugar and cloves, to keepe a fair correspondence with that place and indeavour to prolong the tyme abovesaid. . . . Butt if the Nague shall earnestly persist therein, the saied Francis Daye shall uppon occasion pishcash him with one of the horses; which, with good words and his being there to negotiate, will (wee hoope) delay

his importancy (that is, importunity) till further order arive from Bantam or elsewhere; and untill then we will noe building bee medled withall.' Day was also to take with him 2,000 pagodas to pay off the Naik at Armagon and some other 'claimorous' creditors there. This money was to be borrowed at Masulipatam at interest. Interestingly enough, Ivy signs this consultation separately from the other factors to avoid acknowledging Cogan's supremacy.

But Day could not set off immediately. The money was not at hand. Moreover, Day had quarrelled with Ivy, who had said that he could deal with ten such men as Day. Day asked for permission to return to England. He wrote to the Masulipatam agency on September 13 that "you alleage I cannot bee spared from the imployment of Madraspatam. I have this seaven dayes attended for a dispeede thither; but, for anything I can perceive, there is noe such thing resolved on, monies being wanting, without which iff you should send mee, it would be a great dishonour to our masters.'

At the same time, Day offered to go to Madraspatam if he were given two thousand pagodas to pay off the Armagon creditors and provided with an able assistant so that 'when we arrive thither wee may as well act as discourse, and fix a firm belief in the minds of those countray people to settle a trade there as soone as our shipps come with meanes.' Finding that the agency had to abandon its intention of borrowing money locally at interest, this being against London's orders, Day offered to guarantee the interest 'untill Cristmas, although I am confident my masters are soe noble that they scorne any of their servants should suffer when their proffitt is totally aimed at.'

New difficulties cropped up before Day could really leave for Madraspatam. Thomas Hudson accused Day of trading privately and of having helped Captain Weddell. Day wrote to the agency on September 27 denying the allegations. The agency decided the next day that the dispute be left to the President of Bantam, expected on the coast before long, to settle.

It was under a cloud, as this may be fairly described, that a fortnight later Day set out for Armagon, expecting to proceed further to Madraspatam. He arrived at Armagon early in October and awaited further developments. He was there at the end of January, 1640, still awaiting permission to build a fort at Madraspatam.

Surat was unwilling to decide on Masulipatam's request for

permission. Cogan had asked Bantam whether they could proceed in the matter, but was told that the coast factories had now been placed under Surat (but they came under Bantam again, perhaps in 1641). Cogan then asked Surat on November 8. He wrote again ten days later, Day having in the meanwhile sent him –'severalls . . . which Importunes us to goe for Madraspatam.' No reply still having been received, he wrote again on December 14, suggesting that it was an excellent moment to Armagon.

At last a reply was received on February 6, 1640. It had been written on January 8. It was noncommittal. Since there were many important facts which had to be taken into account in coming to a decision and since these could only be 'acculmilated by you upon sight of the place whereaboutes you intend to raise the worke,' Surat said that it must necessarily refer the whole action to the people on the spot. Moreover, 'wee conceive, according to the Import of your letters,' that the work will be 'so farr advanced that our directions will come to Late to Improve the Action if you have gone throught with it.'

Surat conceded the justice of Masulipatam's request for a new settlement, but only on information available to it. 'That some such place is very necesarie unto for provision of Paintings for the Southern factories, wee are by your information induced to credit; that the Naique of Armagon had abus'd you and rob'd those that trade with you, your confession publisheth.' That the Naik, angry should the English leave his territory, might try to prevent the fort's guns from being removed was a possibility to reckon with. 'How you can prevent his designes and force them from thence will be a matter (wee believe) of some difficulties. The matter called for a most serious deliberation and prepention for its contrivall and performance; and therefore we could wish the Agent had byn present to assist and further with his abeler advice, the progression and perfection of the whole Machine. If you goe forward with it, doe what you resolve on to purpose, and build no such mock forts as that of Armagon etc., and so wee wish you good success to your undertakings.'

When, in 1642, London asked Cogan to justify the building of the fort, he quoted from the previous letter. But he omitted two passages from Surat's communication of January 8. The first remarks that only people on the spot could decide the suitability of the 'Scite, the Nature of the Moulde whereon it is to be founded, the

Native helps the circumadjacent country yealdeth for its strengthening, with many other not known to us.'

Surat also suggested an alternative in Tranquebar. 'Tengumbarr (if the Danes would part with yt) we have heard is a convenient serviceable and defencible fortification. Wee beleeve none here hath power to dispose of it; yet if their povertie should induce them to poart with yt, and that you founds yt so usefull and serviceable to your business as ut hath beene reported, that place woulde merritt our owneinge.'

The letter must have placed the Masulipatam agency in a quandary. It contained no definite decision. But Cogan decided to treat it as permission to proceed. He and other local factors were convinced that Armagon must be abandoned. Their letters of the time contain numerous denunciations of it. A few more may be quoted here, from a communication to Surat dated November 8, 1639 'Armagon was better lost then found.' In another passage,they say that 'the house and fforte is so decayed that to continue it bit one (e) yeare longer it will cost a 1,500 or 2,500 pagodas, which moneys woold halfe build defenceable place in a Naiques country adjoining St. Thoma.' It is hardly surprising that, in view of what seems to be an almost obsessive dislike of Armagon, the Masulipatam agency decided to take the risk. Cogan was rather disingenuous when, in 1642, he declared that he built the fort taking that letter for his warrant; 'for being subordinate, he durst not stir. . . till order.'

Cogan and Day were at Armagon when they received the letter, carey in February, 1640. They speedily completed the dismantling of the fort, a process which had already begun with the removal of the guns. There is no mention of the local Naik interfering. Sailing in the *Eagle*, which was accompanied by the *Unity* and possibly another ship, the party arrived off Madraspatam on February 20. The reports which it must have sent to Surat after arrival have been lost.

The group which, without knowing it, created history seems to have included Humphrey Tompkins and John Brown, both factors, two writers, a gunner, a surgeon, a European carpenter, smiths and coopers, and servants many or most of them also European. There was at least one Indian, Nagabhattan, who was the company's gunpowder maker. Six years after his arrival he made an endowment to the Chennakesava Perumal temple in

Madraspatam. There were also a few Portuguese and other private traders. The garrison consisted of about twenty-five soldiers under an officer, Lieutenant Jermin, and a non-commissioned officer Sergeant Bradford.

It was thus that the English came to Madras.



Francis Day's Fort.

—*From an old print.*



A Masulipatam 'Chintz'. The designs are Hindu.

The Palace at Chandragiri.



The Dutch Fort at Pulicat.
This carving is from a tombstone in Pulicat.



The Santhome Coast.



Masulipatam in the Seventeenth Century.
— From Churchill's *Collections of Voyages.*



A 'bird's-eye view of Bantam'.
— From Henry Beveridge's *History of India.*

The Fort, the Island and the Black Town.
This map depicts the situation a little later than that described in this book.

7

Name and Location

A DISAPPOINTMENT awaited the English when, soon after their arrival, they called upon the Naik of Poonamallee to begin building the fort. 'The Nague hath confest before us that hee never had an Intent or did ever promise to build other than with Tody Trees and earth; laying the fault on the Lingua (interpreter) for misunderstandinge of him at the time of treatie.' This is Cogan's own statement, in a letter from Masulipatam to Surat on October 14, 1640. Surat, writing to London, gives a slightly different account. When Cogan invited the Naik to begin work, 'it seemes there was no such thing meant; for he replyed; The Linguist had misrendred his intentions; That he promised nothing but the ground and some other petty Assistances, And that he had neyther monies nor materialls wherewith to commence, much lesse to perfect, so great a worke.'

This could have proved a serious difficulty. Though the English were to have repaid the cost of the fort after the Naik had built it, they could not have had much money to expend immediately. They had had to borrow at Masulipatam to pay off the clamorous Armagon creditors. Fortunately for them, the arrival of two ships, the *Expedition* from Bantam and the *Hopewell* from England, provided them with the money needed and they set to work.

Day was so determined that the fort should be built that, when he heard of the Naik's inability, he undertook to pay the interest on any money that might be needed.

The first stone was probably laid on March 1, 1640. It is not easy to account for the name the fort received. As early as January 27, 1642, the Surat presidency calls it 'this Fort St. George.' About

four months previously a Dutch document mentions the English 'strecte St. Joris.' The name could not have originated because a part was completed by St. George's Day. If work began only on March 1, this was impossible. It has to be assumed that the name was simply bestowed after England's patron saint.

The Naik's 'cowle' to Day describes the site offered as 'in or about Madraspatam, as they shall think most convenient.' A letter from Swally, near Surat, to the company on December 29, 1640, calls it 'a place (rather a plot of ground).' It is not clear what this distinction signifies. No document specifies the area exactly. There is only indirect information, and that is from the next century. A map of 1733, purporting to be of the 'old fort' and its surroundings, locates the fort immediately south of Black Town and south-east of 'Pedanaigues Pettah.' The North or Elampore, river, now called Cochrane's Canal, divides the latter area from open ground to its west. This region contains brick kilns and a 'Choonga Chuly,' both on the banks of the river. Through it runs the 'road to Egmore.' On either side of this road at a distance is depicted 'Moors Mettah.'

The most striking feature in the map is the ground immediately to the south of the fort, but separated from it by a river. Three structures are marked there, 'Mr Drackes Gt. Bridge', 'Magazine' and 'Granary.' To the west of the ground, beyond an arm of the river, lies 'Suncarame Garden.' To the latter's south is the 'place where the Moors collect custom.' To its south lies 'Triplycan' and to the latter's south, after an interval of space, 'Symand Garden.' 'Gopons' are marked along the east arm of the river enclosing the island, and 'fishing huts' at the confluence of the river with the sea.

This must have been the site that the Naik gave Day. Since his 'cowle' specified that the English were to collect the revenues of the town, it is reasonable to surmise that the area depicted in the map of 1733 was more or less what was initially granted. Colonel Love describes the area thus, 'The boundary passed through a point on the coast 300 yards north of the river outlet, and travelled across the Island to the cut uniting the two rivers. It then followed the Ellamore River (Cochrane's Canal) for a distance of 1,000 yards, curved inland, but subsequently met the river again at the north-west angle of the present George town. Bending due east till about 1,000 yards from the coast it then turned north for a distance of some 2,000 yards, Finally, it travelled again east to the sea. It thus enclosed a compact area, save for a projecting coast strip at its

northern end. The total length of the tract from north to south was about three and a quarter miles, and its mean width one mile.'

Two problems arise now. The origin of the name of 'Madras' is in dispute among scholars. But this is not all. The precise location of Madraspatam and Chennapatnam in relation to each other has to be determined. Earlier studies of the latter problem are vitiated by failure to consult Indian records and traditions.

A study of the European sources provides the important fact that before Day arrived on the scene there were two villages or towns near where he built the fort. These were Cnennapatnam and Madraspatam. 'Patnam' is a common Tamil suffix to names of locations on the sea. There are many examples of this, a few in other parts of Madras itself. That Day on his first visit, on July 27, 1639, did not land in an emptiness of sand is clear from his statement that on his arrival he was 'enterteyned with much Honour by the Nague himself etc; Merchants, Painters and Weavers.'

The problem has been obscured by the misconception that Damarla Ayappa specifically requested the English to name after Chennappa, his father, the town they were to develop. This story is not to be found in the official English records. Neither Cogan nor Day makes this statement. It occurs only in later documents.

What seems to be the earliest of these is 'Relation of several Passages since the founding of the town of Madraspatam,' written by Chambers, who was Agent between 1658 and 1662. The relevant passage runs thus: 'Anno 1639, when we were at Armagon, Damarla Japa Naindu write to Mr Day, that he would have a Town founded in his father Chennappa Naindu's name; and that, if he would come and live in the said town what Cowle he would desire should be given him. After the receipt of which letter Mr Day and Mr Coggin, with three Ships, arrived hither; which when Japa Naindu heard of, he came to visit them, and told them that, if they would build a town in his Father's name, that they should have what privileges they desired to which Mr Coggin and Mr Day answered that, if he would procure the King and the Roylaes Cowle, they would build a Fort and dwell in it which the said Japa Naindu promised he would perform and carry them before the King and the Roylaes, who should give them the Cowle they desired upon whose words we remained here.

'A month after our arrival there arose a great Storm, so that the three Ships were driven ashore, to our great loss, which we did

not so much value, but were afterwards at great charge in building the Fort and Town; which Vencatapate Naindu, Japa Naindu, and Chinnum Shettee (Chenna Chetty, another nobleman) informed King Serengaroylu of; who afterwards sent his people to bring Mr Greenhill up to him and hearing his relation was very joyful; to which cowle, given for five years, while Damarla Japa Naindu's people remained there, all things were justly carried.'

This statement contains many errors of fact. Sriranga III had nothing to do with the grant of the site. He came to the throne only in 1642, three years after the cowle. While Chenna Chetty was well disposed towards him, he was an enemy of the two Damarla brothers. In fact, he imprisoned Venkatapathi, and Ayappa gathered an army to secure his release. Ayappa's people did not remain here for five years. They were out of royal favour following the accession of Sriranga III in 1642. The statement reads like the recollections of factors not historically inclined which were reduced to paper about a score of years after the event.

The story is repeated by Bundla Ramaswami Naidu in his *Memoir on the Internal Revenue System of the Madras Presidency* written in 1820. He states that in the early part of the seventeenth century, when 'the Company's Agents were obliged to remove their factory from Armagal, the Company's Agents at Calcutta requested the assistance of one of our ancestors, named Berry Timapa, an inhabitant of Palacole, a Dutch factory near Meddipollam, in using his influence with the native princes in this coast to establish a Factory.

'Accordingly, he came out to this part of the Country, and procured them permission from one Damarla Vacantappa Naick to build a Factory at Madras. It being found necessary that the sanction of the ruling prince of the Dynasty of Royaloo, who then reigned at Chandragerry, for three Villages, namely Egmore, Tondavadoo and Poodupauk; when Damerla Vencattappa Naick, or his Agents at Poonamallie, insisted upon building the Town in the name of his father, Chennam Naick, as he was in the immediate possession of the place, the Dynasty of Royaloo being at that time in a declining state. Berry Timmapa assisted in building a Town (which was accordingly called Chennapatnam).'

This account contains such palpable errors that it should be rejected in its entirety. The company's agents were not then at Calcutta, the three villages were not acquired until much later, and

there was no question of Sriranga III granting the initial permission. Nor is it true that the new town was named after Chennappa.

For, Chennapatnam already existed. That was why neither Cogan nor Day makes the statement about the Damarla brothers' request. Ankabhupala's assertion in his Telugu poem, *Ushaparinayam*, that, because the people of Pralayakaveri, the Dutch at Pulicat, were incessantly fighting with the people of Mylapore, the Portuguese at Santhome, Ayappa founded the town of Chennapatam between them to separate them, is conclusive proof. The town could have been set up only when Ayappa held power. His brother, Venkatapathi, from whom he derived his authority, was influential at the court of Venkata III, his brother-in-law. Venkata ruled from 1635 to 1641. He was succeeded by Sriranga III, with whom Venkatapathi fell out as early as 1643. A letter from Fort St. George, dated January 4, states that the new emperor had imprisoned him finding that he was intriguing with Golkonda and that Ayappa was gathering an army to get him released. The emperor deprived Venkatapathi of all his territories except Poonamallee and the surrounding district. Chennapatnam must, therefore, have been founded between 1635 and 1643. Since Ankabhupala says nothing about the English, but mentions only the Dutch and the Portuguese, it must have been established in the earlier part of this period, before 1640.

Confirmation of the prior existence of Chennapatnam comes from Kavali Venkataboriah, an assistant of Colonel Colin Mackenzie, an honoured name in the annals of Mamallapuram and Amaravati. A Mackenzie manuscript enumerates the additions of territory at Madras between 1639 and 1763. It is superscribed, apparently by Mackenzie: 'This Paper was communicated by one of the Maratta Bramins employed in a respectable Office in the Accountants or Canoongoe Department of the Revenue under the Arcot Circar. I have reason to believe it was compiled or Abstracted from Official Documents.'

Titled *Historical Account of the Establishment of the Europeans at Madras or Chinnapatam, from a Maharatta Paper Ms. Translated by C. V. Boria in 1802*, it says that the English merchants, 'proposing to build a Cotee to carry on their commerce on the Sea Coast, made proposals to the Damarla family seeking their consent and permission to form their Establishment in some convenient part of the Coast, under their protection.' What the writer calls Polligars

ceded them four villages. 'The first was Madras Coopom. They built a Cotee on the land of this village which is named Madras.' The other three were 'Chennaik Coopom, Arkoopom and Maleput.'

The full account contains some obvious errors, particularly about Sriranga III. It is a little strange that so many early writers on the origins of Madras should have been confused about the date of his succession. Does the explanation lie in the fact that, since the times were troubled, what with civil war and invasion, the real historical facts could not be realised except by a few people?

The value of the account lies in two statements. Here is another writer who categorically says that it was the English who made the overtures. Secondly, the English built a 'cotee' on Madras Coopom which is named Madras. So, both Chennapatnam and Madraspatam already existed when Day arrived on the scene. The evidence is irrefutable. It follows that the account has nothing to say about Venkatapathi asking that his father's name be commemorated in the supposed new town the English were to build on his land.

That Madraspatam already existed needs no demonstration. Innumerable references to it exist in the English letters written before the founding. The firman which the Naik gave Day in 1639 specifically refers to 'our port of Madraspatam'. A Masulipatam consultation held on September 5, 1639, describes Madraspatam as 'a port towne between Pullacatt and Santomey belonging to Vincatedree Nague'. Eight days later, Day himself refers to the town by name. Another reference before the fort began to be built occurs in a letter the Masulipatam agency wrote to the Surat presidency on October 25, 1639. There it is 'a place called Madraspatam, neere St. Thomay, where the best paintings are made, or as anywhere on this coast.'

It is abundantly clear that both Chennapatnam and Madraspatam existed before 1640. Chennapatnam must have been erected later. It was perhaps not more than five years old at the time the fort began to be built. There is no written evidence on Madraspatam's age. Surmise is the only resource. The manner in which the name appears in the 'firman' of 1639 suggests that the town was in existence for quite some time. It was older than Chennapatnam.

It could not have been anything more than a cluster of fishermen's huts, of the kind still to be seen on the coast. A letter from Fort St. George, written in May, 1661, says, 'At the Companies

first beginning to build a fort, there were here only two French padres and about six fishermen's houses.' A Dutch letter of early 1641 says that the settlement formerly consisted of between fifteen and twenty fishermen's huts. It may be that Day deliberately exaggerated its importance into that of a port the better to commend it to his superiors' attention.

Chennapatnam and Madraspatam, then, were two mainly fishing villages, in existence before Day arrived. There has been much discussion in earlier books on Madras on their relative locations. Both were coastal hamlets standing within a short distance of each other. They coalesced shortly after the fort was built to form a single unit called Madras. English historians attach much importance to the fact that the native name was Chennapatnam. This name is falling into disuse.

The core of Chennapatam was the present municipal divisions of Muthialpet and Peddanaickenpet. Madraspatam lay a little to the south and south-east of Chennapatnam, in the area roughly between the fort and the High Court with extensions westwards and northwestwards. All the three, the fort, Chennapatnam and Madraspatam, were located within a short distance of each other. They are best regarded as forming a single unit. That was what they became shortly after the fort was built. This must have been after Sriranga's grant of 1645 and Golconda's of 1672.

There remains the problem of the origin of the name, Madras. The vanity of historians perhaps forbids the realisation that it is insoluble. Innumerable are the attempts to solve it, but all the suggestions are unconvincing. Some are utterly fanciful.

The name was written in innumerable forms in the seventeenth century. It occurs as 'Medraspatam', 'Madraspatam' and 'Maddaraspatan', all in 1639; 'Madrazpatam' in 1640; 'Medrespatnam' in 1641; 'Madrasspatam' in 1643; 'Madrassapatam' in 1646; 'Madras' in 1643; 'Madraspatan' (used by Tavernier in 1654); 'Madrastapatan' (Navarette, 1646-1672): Medrispatnam' (Schouten, 1658–1665) 'Madrespatan' (Baldaeus, 1672), 'Maderas' and 'Madirass' (Fryer, 1673). This fact can lend no clue to a solution of the problem. The English and other foreigners took extensive liberties with Indian proper names at this time and later. The wealth of synonyms only shows that the polysyllables were too much for European tongues.

The first suggested origin of the city's name that must be dis-

carded is that which would derive it from a certain Madrasen, a Christian living at Madraspatam when the English arrived. Bundla Ramaswami Nayudu asserts that his ancestor, Timmappa, exerted his influence with Madresen, the headman of the fishermen's village, who would not part with the piece of ground which was his plantain garden, to obtain it on which to build the fort, promising him that he would cause the factory which was about to be erected to be called after his name as Madaresenpatam, or Madraspatam.

This statement is demonstrably an error. The site had received the name of 'Madraspatam' before the English arrived. A later English writer calls the attempted derivation 'no more than an evolution of the inner consciousness of a romantic writer'. It is a plain fable.

A cognate suggestion is disabled on another ground. This would derive the name from a certain Portuguese family, the Madras, which seems to have lived in Santhome. In an excavation for a chapel in Mylapore in 1927 there was brought to light a fine tombstone bearing a Portuguese inscription, translated as follows. 'This is the grave of Manuel Madras and of his mother, Son of Vencente Madra and of Lucy Brague. They built this Church at their own expense in the year 637'. The number, 637 is obviously a mutilation of a year in the seventeenth century. But it is unlikely that a Portuguese family living four miles away from Madraspatam could have bestowed its name on the village. There is nothing to connect the two. The link is based on similarity of names, a very unsound basis.

Another attempted derivation is from a Hindusthani word, 'madrasa', meaning a college. A book, *Account of the Trade in India*, by Charles Lockyer, published in 1711, states that an old college existed at Fort St. George early in the eighteenth century, and that this building was the same as a domed structure called the Governor's house in a map of the fort in 1673 published in Dr. John Fryer's book, *A New Account of East India and Persia*. In fact, the building was no 'madrasa' at all, but a collegium, a residence for the company's junior civil servants. A 'madrasa' in a Christian fort in Vijayanagar times is a chronological impossibility.

Many other explanations have been offered, but all are even less credible. A Persian chronicle of the Nawabs of Arcot, the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, written by Burhan Ibn Hassan about the end of the eighteenth century, says that the site Day chose was 'known as

Makhraskuppam in the taluk of Poonamallee.' The account contains some errors, as in stating that the English settled in Chennamnayak kuppam adjacent to Madras, and named it Chennapatan. But it does contain some valuable hints about the real position. Thus, it recognises that Chennapatnam already existed. It also says that the English were 'granted through the kindness of Damaralawar three places, viz; Chennamnayak-kuppam, Arkuppam and Bailpet, which were within the taluk of Poonammallee'. These three names resemble those that Boriah mentions. It is interesting that, according to Burhan, it was the English who took the initiative in seeking a plot of ground. 'During the reign of the Rail (the Raja of Chandragiri) the Raja of Payanghat, the representatives of the East India Company strengthened their friendship with his diwan, the zamindar of Kalastri named Damarlawer....; they sent presents and gifts to the Raja through Damarlawar, and sought a plot of land on the sea-coast for the purpose of erecting a factory'.

It is ridiculous to derive the name of Makhraskuppam from Marakkayarkuppam, or from Mandarapatnam (the realm of the stupid), a joke to which Lassen, the great indologist, lent himself, an awful instance of the frailty even of the very learned, or from Madeiras, a Portuguese expression for a timber depot. The last suggestion is totally untenable.

A suggestion better worthy of consideration is contained in the *Anandaranga Vijaya Champu*, a Sanskrit biography, written by Srinivasa in 1752, of the celebrated French Indian diarist, Anandaranga Pillai, and his father, Thiruvengadam Pillai. This work calls Madras Chennapattana and Chennakesavapura. It has been suggested that the latter was the town's original name, later abbreviated to Chenapattana. The name was derived from the Chennakesava Perumal temple, or the Great Pagoda, which originally stood on the site now occupied by the High Court.

This suggestion is more plausible than any other, but it is of the eighteenth century, more than a hundred years removed from the event. Then, there is the evidence of *Ushaparinayam* that the town was named after Chennappa Naik.

As Colonel Love says, further pursuit of the subject is unprofitable.

8

Development

The first stone of Fort St. George was laid on March 1, 1640. This is deduced from the fact that in the charges subsequently preferred against Cogan the cost of the fortifications is reckoned from this date. The fort was to be nearly a square on plan, with a bastion at each angle. Another square fort, a type popular at this time among military engineers, already stood at Pulicat. When the Madras fort was completed, it measured 108 yards from north to south and 100 from east to west.

The domed square building in the centre of the fort, the Governor's or the factory house, was probably built first. On the evidence of the map in Fryer's book, depicting the fort in 1673, the earliest visual evidence available, this structure stood diagonally to the square, each face of the house defending the gorge of a bastion. Around this building was 'a square court-yard walled in by four bastions and intervening curtains', defended by brass cannon. At the four corners of the fort there were bastions, also defended by brass guns. The western side was open to, and bounded by, a channel of the river Cooum, and outside the southern wall, to prevent it from being scaled, a moat was dug and filled with water. There were two gates in the northern wall and none elsewhere; and strong palisades stretched from both the eastern corners down to the sea. Only Europeans were allowed to live within the fort. But outside the northern wall Indians built houses and when some time later the enclosure was extended the fort area contained some Indian houses.

Within a fortnight of work commencing on the fort on March 1, a great storm struck the coast. It destroyed both the *Eagle* and

the *Unity* in the roads. The *Eagle* initially rode out the storm, but went aground at Alamaparai. A part of the cargo and stores was ultimately recovered, but the company suffered a heavy loss. The Eagle's commander, Jonathan Carter, was accused of negligence and sent prisoner to Surat.

The south-east bastion was the first to be completed and guns were mounted on it, before the close of 1640. This, and the north-east bastion, the next to be erected, were built of mud and cased with 'iron stone', or laterite brought from the Red Hills. The third, probably the north-west one, was constructed of earth in 1642. The fourth arose at a later period. By 1652 only one of the four curtains connecting the bastions had been built. The original design of the fort was not completed till 1666.

English correspondence provides occasional glimpses of the progress of the work. The factors' main concern is money. Time and again they clamour for it. Two ships arrived about this time, one from Bantam and the other from England, and the factors had some money. But a fort is expensive to build, and the factors set up a clamour for more.

Cogan wrote from Masulipatam to Surat on October 14, 1640, 'The worke now is in a good forwardness. If it proove good and benificial for our Masters (as wee doubt not off) the honour will Redound to you; And therefore you, as you tender your owne honnour, the honour of our Nation, and the honour and proffitt of our Masters, must not only strengthen it with men and matterialss, but with means to Imploy such people as comes from our Neighbours to Inhabitt with us. At present wee are neere 400 families, who daily increase, to the noe small vexation of our loveing neighbours; but as now they hasten to us in hopes of gaine, if they faile in their expectations through not giving them Imployment, they must and will away againe.'

Surat despatched this letter and some others to London with some self-exculpatory remarks of its own. Evidently it feared London's displeasure at the building of the fort at a time when the Company's existence was in jeopardy. That is why it goes to great lengths in explaining what the Masulipatam factors had done.

From the Coast factors' letters London will learn 'how you became ingaged in the founding and Erecting a New Fort on that Coast, when your old Ruinous building at Armagon was deserted. It hath bine a continued Tenent (that is, tenet, article of faith)

among as many of your Servants as have bine imployed in thos parts, That Goods, especially Paintings, cannot be procured, nor secured when acquired, unless you have some place of your owne to protect the workemen from the fraequent inforcements of those tyranous Governors to lodge your Goods free of the mischievous Attempts which those treacherous Gentues or Inhabitants of that Country are too often ready to adfer against them.'

Surat traces the subsequent development, 'such a place (rather plot of ground) whose site and conveniences are in the Agents etc; letters largely discussed, being for ought to heare or know to the contrary offered by that Nague to Fra. Day and that offer furthered by him to the Agent etc; notice. He was directed to take a view of it and to treat with the Nague about his confirmation of sundry Immunities and priviledges they would have graunted unto them if the ground liked them. All which was readily effected, the place liked, Their Propositions consented unto and approved, and the Nague by promise ingaged to be at the charge himselfe of erecting a substantial fortification.'

The presidency cannot refrain from congratulting itself on its foresight, a quality which the agency so sadly lacked. 'This unexpected successe and unparraleld kindness in the Naigue were by Fra. Day emphatically notified to the Agent etc. They upon notice thereof hasten these growing hopes of a new, nimble and most cheape plantation, which we more admired than Credited, and therefore advized that although they should find that Naigue miraculously inclyned so liberally friendly, and more really then could enter our beleife, to deal with them, yet they should proceed cautelously, Enquiring first into the causes that induced the Naigue to be so good unto them, And so by circumstances learne his Intendements; since it was not probably that these his Curtesies were so freely bestowed to gaine our friendship only, but rather by our vicinity to secure himself from his Neighbours growing greatness and to have (when this Fort should be created) a safe place to retire into and theare by our assistance defend himself.'

Explaining that the Naik told Cogan that he had never promised to build the fort himself, but would only offer 'the ground and some other petty Assistances,' Surat proceeds, 'Your people being now come thither, and finding the ground very convenient for such a service as intended, began to lay the foundation, advized us what had passed twixt the Naigue and them, and that now you

must pay for the erection of the Fort if you meant to have one, for they being so farr ingaged in that Action could not with reputation desert the place or desist from building, though the Naigue had thus faltered with them. We blamed theire indiscretion or negligence that would not better understand the Naigue, prescribed continuance of care and caution to prevent greater mischiefes that might through that Peoples treachery befall them, and enjoyned them, since they were resolved to prosecute the worke, to proceed faire and softly, in expectation of what you might please to enorder in affaires of this nature.'

Surat is able to report progress at the site, 'Though the Portugals of St. Tome opposed theire proceedings what they might, yet they have so prospered that now the building is in good forwardness and three or four hundred families of Weavers, painters and other Artificers come to live under your protection. So that it is become a place of great hopes, whence (if Mr. Cogans etc; relations may be credited) you may acquire yearly very great quantities of Long Cloth for England, and Paintings and many other sortments of Stuffes and Cloathing vendible at Bantam and your other Residencies subordinate to that Presidency. The other Conveniences and proffits that may from this Fort accrue to you intimated in the Agent etc; letters are in probability acquirable, and will deserve your consideration and owning, and should, we thinke, Encline you to improve them yet more to your advantage by furnishing in ample manner means to theire acquiry.'

Finally, Surat asserts that it cannot be held responsible for the fort being built 'as the Agent etc in theire letter to you falsely intimate.'

This was the position some six months after work had begun on the fort. At about this time the company announced freedom from imposts to those who settled near the fort. 'Proclamation was made in the Companies name that for the terme of thirty years noe custome of things to be eaten, dranke, or worne should be taken of any of the towne dwellers'. The offer proved attractive. The Dutch factors wrote early in 1641 that the settlement, where there had been only 15 to 20 fishermen's huts formerly, had now about 70 or 80 houses. Many people driven away from Santhome and the neighbouring places because trade was declining there settled down in Madraspatam. Surat estimated the number at between 300 and 400 families of artificers.

No letters from Madras written in 1640 and 1641 have survived. The information about the offer of freedom from imposts is contained in a document of 1661. But Masulipatam letters of the two years have been preserved. Cogan and Day wrote to Surat on September 15, 1640 and the agency on October 14 that money is scarce. They have been unable to collect the debts due. They estimate the cost of the fort at 4000 pagodas (or 2000 pounds in terms of money value sixty years ago). The higher authorities may object to the cost. 'Wee will not saie but the first two or three yeares it will be chargeable, for who is that plants an orchard and cann the first years receive its benefitt. But whoever shall live a three or four years (and that the Company follow their trade in any indifferent manner) shall see that the incomes of that place by customes and else will be not only able to deffray itselfe but the charge of the whole Coast.' The letter makes an appeal for money for Madras.

A further appeal followed on November 27 to 'furnish us with moneys to Imploy our Inhabytants att Madraspatam, without which we feare theil leave us to the shame and dishonour of our nation. For what is it but to loose all yf, being posest of a pile of stone, which will cost now small matter the keepinge, and noe people to Come neere it, thereby to raise some Utilitie to defray the Charge.'

As for progress on the fort, Masulipatam reported that one bulwark had been completed at the cost of less than 1500 rials of eight, and that 4,500 more would complete the work. Perhaps alarmed at the magnitude of the expenses, the factors suggest that Day be required to give Surat 3,000 or 4,000 pagodas or at least good security for the sum. Day would be leaving for Surat to 'conferr with you conserneinge it, else must he have ben as bigg as his word er he had gone from hence.' Surat absolved Day of the necessity. But there were complaints against him concerning some Coromandal cloth. He sailed for England and arrived there in July 1641. At the end of that year the Company employed him again, saying nothing about his part in building the fort. He was in Madras on July 6, 1642.

Day found that some progress had been made on the fort. The number of inhabitants had increased, and they included several Portuguese and mestizas, or Eurasians. Thomas Clarke, son of the Masulipatam Agent before Ivy, was one of the early settlers. He lived near the fort. But the actual construction of the fort was

rather laggard. The Dutch factors at Pulicat wrote to Batavia on September 4, 1641, 'Their fortress at Madraspatanam. . . still made little progress; the second bastion had reached the height of a man. They seemed, however, to adhere to their resolution, as soon as they obtained means, to build the fortress with four bastions as marked off.'

In January, 1641, Surat again defended itself against the charge of complicity in erecting the fort. Because Cogan 'pretends that the foundation of the Fort St. George was laid by our order, wee must necessarily contradict him from his own letters which it seems have bine received also by your Worships. If not, at last yeare, wee are againe ready to prove what peradventure (the first Projector of it) ffra. Day (being at home with you) will vouch.'

Then follows a repetition of an account of the course of events in Madraspatam. 'Wee prescribed the most of Caution and urged even in the same words, what your Worships have bine pleased to say of it, That Armagon was not deserted with intent to raise out of its Ruines a new charge unto you. But ere our letters arrived, The work was begun by Fra. Day and paid for from your Cash. Which when wee blamed in the Agent and put him in mind of the Naigue's specious promises, Hee answered That hee had said so much to the Naigue, who (as well hee might) derided him for thinking so much folly as that hee, without any obligation to, would build a fort for us. In a word, the fault was laid upon Mr. Daies misunderstanding the Naigue.

'And so the walls were raysed which, rather then the Worke should Cease, Day offered we know not what Contribution towards it. Now the greatest part of them are finished and may happily (that is, haply, perhaps) stand to doe you good service; for, without such defensible places, your goods and Servants among such treacherous people are in Continual hazard. The just feare whereof hath induced the Portugalls, Dutch and Danes to frame unto themselves more safe habitations; and such questionlesse, will be wanting unto you, although considering the subsistance of your present affaires and the meane trade you drive on that Coast, This ffort St. George is in its erection unseasonable in its being over Chargeable. However, hitherto we have heared a faire report of it. The worst is its over neare Vicinity to the Portugalls of St. Thome, not in respect of any hurt they can doe the ffort, but because of the many idlers, both men and woemen, who frequent the ffort so much.

That divers of the English souldiers (Mr. Cogan saith) married; which, hee pretends, must necessarily bee tolerated, or the Hotshots will make liberty otherwise to Coole themselves—Strange Tenents to bee received for truth.'

But Madraspatam has something to recommend it: 'In those parts abundance of good and cheap Cloth is said to be procurable, and wee find the experiment thereof in the large Investment the Dutch yearly make thereabouts. So that if you could resolve to inlarge your Trade, wee conceave by what we have heared of it that the ffort is Conveniently enought Scited, and may serve you to many good purposes.'

The company's attitude towards the projectors of the fort was far from consistent. It frequently changed its mind. Though it could have taken Day to task when he was in England from July 1641, to the end of that year, it did nothing. But soon after he sailed for India it received a letter from Surat dated January 27, 1642, blaming him as the 'first Projectour of the forte of St. George,' and it entered the charge in its Black Book. Day, however, did not suffer thereby.

The same ambivalent attitude is to be found among the factors in India. Surat's is easily understood. It seems really to have believed that Madras was a good investment, but it was consistent in refusing to take the responsibility for it. Perhaps it was aware of the company's embarrassments in England. Certainly, neither Cogan nor Day was justified in pleading Surat's permission for building the fort. It did not grant it. But then, neither did it deny it.

The people who had made up their minds about the necessity for Madras were Cogan and Day. They had the best of reasons. They had suffered both at Masulipatam and Armagon, and the strong expressions they frequently made about the rulers, both Muslim and Hindu, is a reflection of their eagerness to get away to Madras. But being subordinates they had to win justification from their superiors. Day frequently exaggerated the value of the site. This is evident not only in his overblown description of poor old Cooum but also in his dithyrambic praise of the 'paintings' available on the Madras coast. The fact was that by far the best 'paintings' were being made on the Masulipatam coast because of the availability there, and nowhere else, of the 'tchay'. If he and Cogan attempted to shift the blame to Surat, that was only what many

people in their position would have done. But his attempt to inculpate Day, as Bantam reported he did in a letter at the end of 1643, is less excusable.

A remarkable change in Madras' destiny approached now. While London and Surat were undecided whether or not it should be abandoned, Cogan transferred to it the seat of the agency from Masulipatam. It became the chief factory on the east coast from September 24, 1641 at a time when Day was on the high seas. But Surat had only reprieved Madras. It wrote to London on January 27, 1642: 'Since you have bine pleased to referr its (that of Madras) maintenance or dissolution to our doome, we have seriously Considered of it, and at last resolved to let it stand still till your next yeares Battery. By which time also, becoming better acquainted with that People, wee shall better know how to determine it'. Meanwhile, however, Cogan had made it the chief factory on the east coast.

The fort was scarcely eighteen months old when it received this dignity. Cogan's decision must be held to reflect less a dramatic growth on its part than his anxiety to remove himself from the clutches, as the English generally thought, of Golconda. It is not clear whether he had Surat's approval for taking the step.

9

Responsibility

Responsibility for the construction of the fort continued to be canvassed by London, Surat and Madras as the months went by. The ship which brought Day to Madras also seems to have conveyed the company's displeasure. The Madras agency wrote to Bantam on September 20, 1642, 'Wee are very sencible how ridiculous wee have made ourselves by doeing what is done, and lye at our Masters mercies'. Writing to London on the same day, it said, 'When Wee doe, as that Wee doe often, fall into Consideration how much you worshipps are displeased with us for proceeding on this worke, it even breaks some of our hearts. Tis now too late to wish it undone, and yet wee may not but tell you that, if so be your worshipps will follow this coast Trade (or rather the Karnatt) this place may prove as good as the best; but all things must have its growth and time. But on the contrary if your worshipps will not continue it, you may do it a way to profit, and not hazard the losse of a man. It may with ease be effected unless the Moors conquere the country before'.

Cogan protested against the blame being ascribed to him alone. 'Your worshipps apply yourselves holely to Andrew Cogan, as if so be that he had no Councell, or that all were done of his owne braine. Hitherto it hath not been so, for all maters of consequence and novell hath byn first maturely considered of in Consultation. But if such consultations should, as too often they have provid ill contrary to expectation, who ought or ought any to be blamed? Tis granted that Andrew Cogan had your order, or the President etc; of Surat, for the dismantling of Armagon, for to that President etc; your worshipps made us subordinate, and so consequently to

be ordered and directed, for they writt to us in this manner concerning Armagon'.

Cogan now decided to retire from the Company's service. He intended to hand over charge to Day and leave for Bantam as soon as possible. He asked Bantam to appoint a new Agent.

But he could not leave. His colleagues remonstrated against his decision, and Bantam, in the spring of 1643, directed him to remain at his post until London sent orders. But in August he found the means of leaving. The crew of the *Hopewell*, ordered to Bantam, refused to sail unless there was on board somebody of authority enough to be able to control the master, Andrew Trumball, a truculent mariner, whose fondness for using his fists to enforce discipline had already driven them to the verge of mutiny. The agency had appointed Day to this invidious post. But Day had quarrelled with Trumball before this. He had travelled with Trumball from England on the *Hopewell*. Soon after his return to India he had proceeded to Balasore, on the Orissa coast, where the company had another factory.

In the middle of 1643, Day along with some others, including Thomas Clarke, the former Agent at Masulipatam, and Richard Cogan, Andrew's son, preferred charges against Trumball, who was suspended. Trumball accused Day of dunkenness. 'Tis noe strange thinge for Mr. Day to be drunke. Drinkeinge with the Moors and Persians at Ballisara, hee soe disguised himself theire presence that they sent him away in a Pallankeene, out of which hee fell by the way. Att Persia, hee fell out with the Dutch and abused them soe when hee was Drunke that hee had like to sett the English and Dutch by the yeares. And another tyme hee made himslef so Drunke at Persia, hee Rann into the sea and like to have drowned himselfe'.

A year later Trumball submitted to the Company a comprehensive indictment of Day and other factors on the coast. He cast accusations about recklessly. Day, Peniston, Thomas Winter and Greenhile werl trading on their own account, a charge of all others most calculated to enrage the company. 'These foure gentlemen are all sworne brothers; and when they perceive they may benefitt themselves in any project, they passe an oath one to another to prosecute their intendments and not dissent one from another untill their ends bee obetyned. And one principal cause of raysing these men to that height of pride and riches which they now possesse is

the keeping of such mighty stocks of money which they call their owne, and with which they buy up all cloths and paintings that are vendible either in the south seas or in England at certains tymes and seasons; and when your shipps come to the coast in June or July they must have 50 per cent profitt'.

It was not to be expected that sworn antagonists like Day and Trumball could sail together peacably. Cogan proposed that he take Day's place on the *Hopewell*, Day acting for him as Agent at Madras. The Council approving this, Cogan sailed on August 27 and arrived at Bantam at the end of November. There he obtained permission to return to England, which he reached in June, 1644. Thus one of the two founders of Madras finally left the scene.

Cogan carried with him a despatch from Bantam to the Company dealing with the eternal question of the fort. 'Heere wee suppose its not amiss to lett your worships understand that Mr. ffrancis Day was the first projecture and contriver of that Forte or Castle in Madraspatan which another, with a greite deal of discontent, labour and pains hath now brought to some good pass, beinge a place of securities on that Coast as the onlie place of secured saiftie with that Title of honoure (Castle) that ever our nation enjoyed in East India and therefore in our opinions to bee highlie esteemed, And for its cost, it's certaine that if your Worships continuew the Indian Trade, in few yeares it will not onlie quitt its owne charge, but allsoe produce benefitt and put monies into your Purses by bringeing of Trade thither, raiseing a Custome there, paying of duties by the Inhabitants neere adjoyning and being replenisht with Merchants (and) Weavers, whereby you may have all things necessarie and convenient for you under your owne command; and happy and glad will manie bee, (where in you will find the benefitt) to come and live under our nation and bee protected by them'.

Continuing to throw the blame on the absent Day the letter proceeded, 'With Mr. Andrew Cogan . . . wee have had some discourse touching the Fort in Madraspatan, which certainlie was at first projected by Mr Ffrancis Day and doubtless Mr Cogan would never have erected it without greate Incouragement thereto by some that might then best doe it.'

To soften the Company's wrath, Bantam pointed to a good source of income. 'Theirto is an Iland scituated in the river, under the command of the castle, whereon is likelie to bee made a greate quantitie of Salt yearlie, which is one of the constantest commodities

in all theise Easterne parts, and much monies are gotton thereby everywhere'.

The wrath descended on Cogan's head on his arrival in England. He was called upon to justify himself, before a committee, against a number of charges, including one of private trading. The first accusation was, 'To answere the building of the Fort St. George, the charge whereof hath cost from the first March 1639, (actually 1640) to the 30th June, 1643, the sum of pagodas new 9250'.

Cogan raised a preliminary objection. The company had ordered that all disputes and differences 'growinge in India should there be ended, to avoide your trouble at home, and so the company have noe reason to put your worshipps and myselfe to this present trouble'. But he would waive this objection and answer the charges.

Cogan's main argument was that 'the President and Councell of Surratt did enorder the building Ditto Fort; and I ought not to be blamed had yt cost far more than yt hath'. Tracing the history of the transaction, he said: 'About July 1639 when the coast was subordinate to Bantam, Mr Ivy being the Chief on the coast, Mr Fra. Day was imploied to treate with the Naigue of Madraspatam for a plot of ground within his country to fortifie upon; which being graunted and Articles drawen between the Naigue and Day in the companies name, he the said Day returnes to Masulipatnam, and acquaintes Mr Ivy etc; how farr he had proceeded. Thereupon a consultation was called, and in that consultation yt was resolved that Mr Day should return to Armagon and from thence houlde faire and good correspondenceye with ditto Naigue until we had advized to Bantam and from thence have order to proceede upon that worke. In September, '39, by Conveyance of the Danes, wee dispeeded to Bantam the articles of Agreement and also Mr Days relacon of the place.

'In October '39 the coast by the Companies order, became subordinate to Surratt, from whence (and not from Bantam) wee daily expect order what to doe. For notwithstanding the Companies positive order to dismantell Armagon, yet, say the President and Councell of Surratt, before you do yt let us know the convenience or inconveniencye of that place, and alsoe let us know the monethlye charges of yt and how yt is in repairs etc; Unto which (after wee had by letter conferred with Mr Day) wee answered in November '39 that the fort of Armagon was much oute of repaire and

would require some thousands of rialls to make yt only habitable. Alsoe wee tould them that Mr Ivy some moneths since had imploied Mr Day to treate with the Naigue of Madraspatam as aforesaid, sent them the articles of agreement and Mr Dayes relacion of the place; and concluded that if they approve of the busines wee would proceed upon the worke'. Cogan asserted that, in reply to this, Surat had, in fact, approved 'the worke'.

The next charge was that the fort was 'overchargeable'. Cogan's reply was, 'Yt is saied yt hath alreadye cost 9250 pagodas; if so, your bookes will make yt appeare to which I refer myself; yet doe beleeve, uppon better viewinge the accompts, that Some will be much lessned, unless (you include) your accompt on Charges merchandize, charges shippinge, charges Dyett, Servants Wages and interest etc; which if you doe, then yt may amounte to such a summ, else not; for as for the charges above saied, yt cannot be denyed but charges of dyett would have appeared wither the Fortt had gone on or no; so would Charge shippinge charge merchandize (if goods had beene bought) and servants wages'.

Cogan also argued that the expenses had mounted because interest had to be paid on borrowed money. Day had taken the responsibility for the interest, but Surat had 'uppon his earnest intreatye remitted it, although his unadvisedness in matters of such importance should have been punished more severely, to teach others more caution in their severall treaties with such perfidious false people.'

Asked 'whither the fort be finished, or how farr yt is proceeded,' Cogan replied, 'Three bulwarcks and the Tower (or house) in the midst is finished, and 34 peeces of Ordnance mounted er I came from thence (This was on August 27, 1643) and some parte of the Materialls provided to goe on with the rest. But for your better informacion I herewith present your Worships with a Mapp or Draught of the Fortt as yt was at first intended, and by which you may more plainly see whats done and whats to doe'. This map, however, is lost. Had it survived, it would have displaced the one in Fryer's book as the earliest now available.

The committee delivered its verdict on May 13, 1645. It exonerated Cogan: 'A very indiscreete action to goe about the building of such a Fort when the companies stocke was soe small, yett if ever the companie have a plentifull stocke, it may be very commodious and advantageious for them; and since it was the

joynt act of all the factors there, and not soly or perticularly of Mr Cogans, and if it should not prove so advantagious for the companie hereafter, it can bee charged upon noe man more justly than on Mr Day and this committee were joyntly of opinion to cleare Mr Cogan of this charge'. He was also acquitted of the charge of private trading. With this he disappears from the history of Madras, to play a small part in the history of the English civil war.

Day followed him to England over a year later. He was Agent in Madras from August 27, 1643 to August 4, 1644 when he was relieved by Thomas Ivy who, so narrowly missing a share in the founding of Madras, now came to claim a little of it in its early history. Work on the fort proceeded slowly, the factors being embarrassed by want of money. 'When it is finished and 100 souldiers for the defence of it,' they wrote to London on September 8, 1644, a month after Day had relinquished charge, 'wee need not feare any inland Enemy unto us in these parts.' But this happy state was yet in the future. 'Three of the foure Quadrangle points,' or bastions, had been erected, but the 'other point with the three walls between the three points which are finished' remained to be built.

Conditions outside the fort were degenerating, and Day's term of office was dominated by the impending overthrow of Vijayanagar power by Golconda and the aggrandisement of the Dutch.

Venkata III died in 1642 and was succeeded by the 'treacherous' Sriranga III, to whom fell the melancholy distinction of being the last of his line. Among his first acts was the dismissal from power of Damarla Venkatapathi, whom he imprisoned on suspicion of intriguing with Golconda, whose celebrated general, Mir Jumla, was about to begin the career of conquests which, paradoxically, was to end in the downfall of Golconda itself. Bijapur too was attacking Vijayanagar at this time. Venkatapathi's place was taken by Chenana Chetty, also called Mollay, the Indian merchant who acted for the Dutch. Mollay's rising influence was another source of anxiety in Fort St. George.

The factors were concerned about their safety in view of the dangers rising outside their unfinished walls. On December 29, 1642, a consultation at the fort decided to strengthen its defences. 'The warrs and broyls increasing in this countrey and now by reason of our great naiques imprisonment drawing nere to us, wee latelie

raised a third Bulwarke of turfe; and wanting gunns to mount thereon, have resolved that the Advice shall spare us foure Minion for that purpose.'

The 'broyls' continued to increase. Fort St. George wrote to Bantam next month: 'This Countrie being all in Broiles, the old Kinge of Karnatt being dead; soe is the Naique of Armagan, whose countrie is all in the handes of the Moores, and whoe will ere long by all likelyhood bee Maisters of all this countrie; for our Naique, not findeing the Respect from the new Kinge as he expected, did make proffer to assist the Moores, but ere he could bringe his treason, twas discovered, he apprehended by the Kinge, who hath seazd a greate parte of his countrie; but wee beleve he will be forc'd suddainley to restore it againe and release him, for our Naiques brother and kindsmen are levying an Armie for his rescue, whoe, with the helpe of the Moores on the other side (who are within halfe a dayes journey of each other) will force his libertie or ruine the whole Kingdome.'

Sriranga won over Venkatapathi for the time being. But he finally disgraced him in 1644. Ayappa died fighting for the emperor at the battle of Erode about 1670. But the English feared that the Dutch would overwhelm them. They wrote to Bantam on January 28, 1644: 'Such a storme is prepareing for us that 'tis to bee feared will even whorle us away from this coast. Our neighbours the Dutch have bine longe a projecting and now they have wrought it that Mollay their Merchant is Like to bee as Powerful with this King as the Serkayle is att Golcondah; and to ingratiate him thoroughly into his favour, they have assisted Mollay with men and Gunns for the subdueing of Castles of our Nague for the king, or rather their owne use; by which means our Nague is Cashered and hee substituted, and is allso made his Treasurer and dus even in a manner command all, and 'tis very probable that hee will governe all the Seaports even to the very verges of Cealon; and whatt this may come to in a short time is noe hard matter to Judge of. Beleive itt 'tis not for naught that the Dutch assist him in this manner for their ayme is to have the sole Trade of the Coaste; and if you doe not sett to the helping hand, and that suddenly, adue to all.'

The factors' fears were realised. 'Some few daies sence hee made demande to have the Government of this place and all the profetts to himselfe, which is Contrary to those Cowles of the former King and our Nagues, for by those the Government is given to us,

with halfe its Proffitt.' The English feared that, if they yielded to these demands, 'the Towne would be suddenly Ruinated by the Dutch raising the rates of customs,-for therein they ground theire pollice to worke us the mischeife.' The English resolved to resist and retaliate.

The situation changed in a few months. 'Mallai' did nothing. But the Golconda forces were threatening the country around the fort. The English expected to be called upon by them to surrender the fort as they had demanded of the Dutch at Pulicat. For the time being, however, there was no danger. 'The Jentues came downe with a greate power, gave the Moores Battle, routed there Armie and put the Moores to flight beyond Armagon'. There, however, the Golconda forces 'are now a gathering a head agine, soe the dainger that we live in is yet unknowne.'

This letter was written on September 8, 1644. Day had relinquished the agency a month before and Ivy had taken his place. The next relevant letter, dated exactly a year later, showed a change in the scene. The Dutch had quarrelled with 'Mollay' and the latter was besieging Pulicat. The dispute had arisen because, according to an account, of the Governor of Pulicat imprisoning 'Mollays sonn, brother-in-law, and familie and takeing awaie of Mollays goods upon a pretence that he was indebted to the Dutch.'

The English at Fort St. George were embroiled in this dispute. They reported to Surat on August 13 that Mollay's soldiers seized a Dutch merchant 'going from St. Tome to Pullicatt'. The Dutch Governor sent a small force with two guns to rescue him, but Mollay's soldiers, though outnumbered, repulsed it. The Dutch had to abandon their guns and could not rescue their merchant 'to their great disgrace and shame'.

'The Marchant is now in our fort upon his ransome of 2000 pagodas, which the Agent hath, upon a Letter from the Governour of Pullicatt to him, ingaged himselfe unto Molay for the payment of the mony or the returne of his Person dead or alive uppon demand.' 'Mollay's' men had seized Dutch goods elsewhere in the kingdom. The English company's merchants had bought some of them and brought them into Fort St. George 'for parte satisfaction of their debts' to the company. The Dutch resented this and announced that they would search English ships and confiscate any of the goods taken from them. They argued that Sriranga had not authorised 'Mollay' to make war on the Dutch and that, consequently, what

the English had received in their fort was nothing but stolen goods. To counter this the English resolved to request Sriranga to state that 'Mollay' had acted under his orders, and to utilise the opportunity to secure a confirmation of their privileges.

They wrote to London on October 1, 1645, 'Wee have bin often tymes sollicited by this kinge to give him a vissit, which never was yett done to him or his predecessors since our first arivall heere, which is now 7 yeares allmost; soe if wee any longer deny his reasonable request, wee may suddainely Expect his Just displeasure and peradventure have a Seidge aboyt us, as our neighbours the Hollanders of one syde and Portugalls of the other, which are seldome free, notwithstanding their great power and defence, who hath twenty for one more than wee, soe that if the like should happen unto us, what can you expect of fifty well and sicke men, to defend your estate and Fort against the king's power. . . .'

It had, therefore, been resolved 'within this few dayes to send upp Mr Henry Greenhill with four other english souldiers for his attendance for the reconfirmation of what was graunted unto Mr. Cogan by the great Nague, under whose protection formerly wee live'd but now the kinge hath taken his power and protection is of noe longer value. Soe now findeing a fitting opportunity, wee doubt not but to have our old priviledges reconfirm'd, with the Adition of a great many more, by this now Reigneing King, which hath brought all his great Lords unto his Comand, which hath not bin this 40 yeares before; this by Mollayes Assistance wee make no question to obtayne.'

The constitutional problem solved itself. Before the letter was despatched, a message arrived from Sriranga stating that he had declared war against the Dutch, ordering the English to assist 'Mollay' in the siege of Pulicat and expressing satisfaction at the prospect of receiving a 'man of quality' like Greenhill.

10

Chief Settlement

Fort St. George reported to Surat on January 21, 1646, that Greenhill had succeeded in his embassy. After meeting the king at Vellore, he had returned and 'hath well effected what he went for, which was to have our ould privalidge, with some addition, neiw confirmed by this King, and his letter for the avouchment of the warre betwixt him and the hollanders, and to maintaine us in the buying of such goods as was taken in the warre; all of which we have obtained under the Kings owne hand.'

This sentence suggests that Venkata III had confirmed Damarla Venkatapathi's firman. No copy of his grant has survived, but that it was made is clear from an English document which mentions 'these Cowles of the former King and our Nague'. There are three copies of Sriranga's grant which was dated November 15, 1645.

The translation of this cowle is in picturesque, expressive Jacobean prose, 'In the year Partrewa, the month of Cartif (a), the Moone in the wane, the King over all King(s) the Holiest and amongst all Cavaliers the greatest, Zree Renga Raya, the Mighty King God, gives this Coule unto Agent Thomas Ivie, Cheife Capt (aine) of the English, and the company of that Nation.

'Forasmuch as you have left Armagon and are come to Xera-Renga-Rayapatan my towne, at first but of small esteme, and have there built a Forte and brought trade to the Poarte; therefore, that you may be the better encoraged to prosecute the same and amplify the towne which beares our name, wee doe freely release you of all the Customes or dutyes upon whatsoever goods brought or sould in that place appertainig (unto) your company. Alsoe we grant unto

your company halfe of all the customes or dutyes which shall be received att the Portt, and the Rents of the Ground aboute the Village Madraspatam; as alsoe the Jaccall ground wee give you towards your charges, by way of piscash.

'Moreover, for the better managing your busines, we surrender the government and justice of the towne into your hands. And if any of your neighboures of Pundomolee shall injure you, wee promise you our ready assistance. And for what provisions shall be brought out of that Cuntry wee will that no Junken be taken thereon.

'If it fortune that any of your companies shipps shall by accident of weather or otherwise be driven ashore att that Porte whatsoever can be saved shall remain your one; and the like touching all Merchants that trade att the Port, if the owner comes to demand it; but if the owner be not to be found, then our officers shall seize the same to our behoofe.

'Wee also promise still to retaine the towne in our protection and not subject it to the government of Pondomollee or any other Nague. And whatsoever Merchandizes of yours that shall pass through the country of Pondomallee, to pay but halfe customes.

'In Confidence of this our Coule you may cheerful proceed in your affaires; wherein if any of our peopell shall Molest you, we give you our Faith to take your cause into our owne hands to doe you right and assist you against them. And that this porte and this our Coule may stand Firme as along as the sun and moone endureth.

'Sere Rama'.

Before Greenhill was sent to Vellore, Fort St. George had expected to gain a 'great many' new privileges. What they obtained was additional territory in the 'Jaccall ground', later called 'Hog's Hill', which represents approximately the site of the General Hospital and Central Station and authority to administer justice. Sriranga refers to "Xera-Renga-Rayapatan my towne". This is, of course, Srirangarayapatnam. Evidently, Sriranga had, on his accession two years after the fort began to be built, changed the town's name after his own. He must have done so because Damarla Venkatapathi was now a rebel, and it would not be appropriate to permit the older name, given after the latter's father's, to stand. But the new name never gained currency.

In fact, this was no time for Sriranga to think of renaming towns. His kingdom was again in jeopardy. In the same letter which

announced Greenhill's successful mission, the factors spoke of the king's worsening prospects. While the seige of Pulicat was dragging on, 'the king of Golcondak hath sent his generall, Meir Gumlack, with a great Armie to appose this King.' Three weeks later, the factors reported, 'the King (Sriranga) and three of his Nagues are at varience, and the King of Vizapoores Armie is come into this country on the one side and the King of Gulcondah uppon the other, both against this King.'

It all ended catastrophically. Mir Jumla captured the fortress of Udayagiri (in Nellore district) from 'Mollay'. The Golconda and Bijapur forces joined together to besiege Vellore. Sriranga was defeated under its walls and forced to submit. The siege of Pulicat collapsed. In October, 1647, Fort St. George reported that Mir Jumla "hath almost conquer'd this Kingdome and reigneth as King under the title of Annabob." He confirmed 'under the King of Gulcondahs great seale all our former privilidges in ample manner as it was graunted unto us by the foresaid fledd Jentue King.'

A great famine came upon the land at this time, evidently because of the perpetual wars. Ivy remained Agent until September 23, 1648, when he was succeeded by Greenhill. Ivy was the last of the three Agents connected with the founding of Madras, in his case tenuously. With his departure from the scene the first chapter in the history of the city draws to an end.

The famine of 1647 was so severe that not only was Fort St. George unable to carry on any trade, but Surat sent a grain ship to save it from starvation. Having survived this, it faced another attack, this time from London. In 1654 its staff was reduced to two factors with ten soldiers for their guard. This, predictably enough, resulted in the Dutch seizing the trade and in the descent of English interlopers in numbers. Only the previous year, in 1653, Madras had been made an independent presidency.

There was another change of policy, dictated by the company's fortunes in war distracted England, in 1658. Madras was made the chief of the settlements in east India, the others on the Coromandal coast and in Bengal being subordinated to it.

11

Chaotic Deccan

Conditions in the Deccan in the seventeenth century, when the European merchants established themselves, were favourable for their ultimate rise to political power. It was not until the eighteenth century that they began to take part in political combinations. This process is held to date from Dupleix's realisation of the possibilities and, less convincingly, from the battle of the Adyar in 1746 when a handful of Frenchmen routed a huge army of the Nawab of the Carnatic. But the Indian powers exhausted themselves by fighting among themselves almost without intermission in the seventeenth century.

This phase of Deccan history dates from the battle of Tallikota in 1565. While it may be true that the defeat did not extinguish Vijayanagar power, the empire was never the same afterwards and in 1672 it came to an end with the death of Sriranga III. The Raichur Doab had been the bone of contention between Vijayanagar and the Deccan Sultans before Tallikota. The Coromandal coast was then seldom affected by war's alarms. But after Tallikota it became the main centre of military operations.

In the half century between the founding of Madras and Golconda's fall in 1687 the Coromandal coast was conquered twice, first by Golconda from Vijayanagar and secondly by the Mughals from Golconda. Mahratta incursions began following the appointmet of Shahji as Governor of the province Bijapur had conquered in south-western Deccan, with Bangalore as his headquarters. The coast was distracted by war to a greater extent that at any time before in its history. With the Indian powers exhausted, it was only

a question of time before the foreigners, possessing many advantages, principally sea power, realised that they could make themselves politically supreme. The main question in the eighteenth century was which of them would make themselves masters. Most observers in the seventeenth century would have said the Dutch. But the Dutch exhausted themselves. The English and the French were left to fight it out.

Two facts stand out in the Deccan's history in the seventeenth century. The first is the incredible crimes and blunders committed by the Vijayanagar emperors, their families and their nobles. It might have been thought that, after Tallikota, the one concern of any Vijayanagar statesman would be to conserve the strength of what remained of the empire and brace it for the further inevitable wars with the Sultans. But there was always a curse on Vijayanagar, the mutual hatred of the members of the royal family. This had disfigured the history of the Eastern Chalukyas of Vengi, and, again in Vijayanagar it was to affect the fate of millions of people. It blazed forth stronger than ever even in mortal peril.

To call in one or the other of the Sultans for assistance against the emperor or a favourite of his in their dispute with him became an elementary device of the rebels. It was not to be expected that the Sultans would render a service without a fee. They learnt that they could intervene in Vijayanagar affairs as they wished. They realised that the empire was to be seized for the asking.

The Vijayanagar emperor had the right to expect the assistance of his Nayaks in the battle for survival. In his hour of extremity Sriranga III appealed to them in the name of the common religion and the temples they cherished. The appeal was ignored. The feudal barons were more intent on ensuring that the emperor did not grow over-strong or that any of their number did not become too powerful. They changed sides as their selfish interests of the moment dictated. One has only to compare their suicidal policies with the single-minded devotion to their national interests that the English factors in their midst displayed, particularly in the detestation of the Dutch, to realise that lack of political vision was bound to be punished.

Thoughtful observers of the scene could not have failed to realise the inevitable end. But they would probably have been surprised at the second dominating fact of Deccan politics at this time. They could not have realised, looking at the victorious progress of the

Golconda and Bijapur arms, which culminated in the annexation and division of the Vijayanagar empire, that the two Sultans themselves were but creatures of a far stronger potentate, the Mughal emperor. The wars of this century were really Delhi reaching towards the far south of the country.

The Mughals extinguished the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmednagar in 1633. Two years later Shahjehan took the first step that ultimately made Bijapur and Golconda virtual protectorates. He sent ultimatums to the two Sultans, calling them mere 'Adil Khan' and 'Kutb-ul-Mulk' respectively, deliberately omitting the royal title of 'Shah'. 'They were squarely reprimanded for their sins and admonished for the future'. Adil Shah signed a deed of submission to the Mughal emperor on May 23, 1636, and Abdullah Kutb Shah in the same month.

This 'deed of submission' was no empty document. Golconda became a vassal State. Kutb Shah gave up one of the cherished privileges of mediaeval monarchy, that of minting coins in the royal name. He had to have the 'kutbah' read with the Mughal's name. He had no longer any foreign policy of his own. In fact, should Bijapur attack his kingdom, he was not to defend it himself, but seek the help of the Mughal viceroy.

A revealing incident indicates the extent of Golconda's subservience. The deed of submission stipulated that from the ninth year of the reign Golconda should pay Delhi two lakhs of "hons" as tribute every year. An envoy and a jeweller arrived in Golconda from the Mughal court to estimate the value of the jewels that were to form part of the tribute. They saw on the Sultan's finger a particularly handsome ring, valued at Rs. 50,000, a huge amount in the money value of the seventeenth century. They reported this to Shahjehan, and he ordered that it should be sent to him, its value to be deducted from the total tribute.

Probably no campaign worth the name could have been undertaken by either of the Sultans without the connivance of the Mughal emperor. It was Shahjehan who, from behind the scenes, directed the campaign of Mir Jumla which finally eliminated Vijayanagar power. The Mughals did not choose to appear in their own persons probably because there were innumerable changes in the viceroyalty of the Deccan, as many as five between 1644 and 1652. When Aurangazeb became viceroy for the second time, the fiction was abandoned, and the Mughals conquered the Deccan for them-

selves. They took Golconda in 1687. These changes affected the English in Fort St. George. Initially, they faced some difficulties, but ultimately all that this frequent fighting led to was enfeeblement of the Indian powers.

Immediately after Tallikota Tirumala, a brother of the slain emperor, tried to hold the empire, or what remained of it, together. His was a task to daunt the stoutest heart. But he soldiered on and succeeded in a measure. He would have been more successful but for the treachery inherent in the Aravidu house in the craving of some individual members for power. It seems inconceivable that so soon after the crowning disaster of Tallikota a member of the royal family should seek the support of one of the Sultans. But that was what Pedda Tirumala, a son of Aliya Rama Raya, did, forgetting what had happened to his father, but very anxious to spite his uncle, Tirumala. The Muslim intervention so soon after Tallikota was not ineffective. Though Tirumala resisted it, he lost parts of the already shrunken empire. On the whole, however, Tirumala's work restored the empire, though in a truncated form, and prolonged its life for about a century.

Tirumala seems to have reigned only for two years after 1570 when he had crowned himself. But he perhaps lived on till 1578. His successor was Sriranga I, who had been viceroy at Penukonda, one of the three viceroyalties into which Tirumala had divided the empire, the others being the Tamil districts ruled from Chandragiri and the Kannada ones from Srirangapatna. Chennappa, Damarla Venkatapathi's father, held Penukonda against the Bijapur Sultan in this reign in 1576.

In the reign of Venkata II, who succeeded Sriranga I in 1585–86, European merchants began to build factories on the coast. By 1614, when he died, the Dutch and the English had come to Masulipatam. The Dutch, who had ample resources, also settled down at Devanampatnam, near Cuddalore, in 1608 and, more important, at Pulicat in 1610. The Danes built themselves a factory at Tranquebar in 1621.

The civil war that followed Venkata II's death absolutely ruined the empire. Gobburi Jaggaraya, a name of infamy in Vijayanagar annals, imprisoned and murdered Sriranga II, whom Venkata II had nominated as his successor, in prison along with his family, except for a young son.

Jaggaraya's own infamous career came to an end at the battle

of Topur in 1616, the southern Nayaks having selected one or other of the sides as suited their interests, with no thought for the integrity of the empire, now more menaced than ever before. It was not in Rama, Sriranga II's son, who had escaped massacre by Jaggaraya, to hold the empire together. The civil war had already exacted its penalty, Bijapur having conquered the western Telugu districts. The young emperor died in 1630, only 28 years old.

Then followed another civil war. Rama had nominated Peda Venkata, a cousin of his, as his successor. But Timmaraja, a paternal uncle of Rama's, seized the government and confined Venkata III to Anegondi, his native place. Sriranga, a nephew of the emperor, rescued him with the help of the Pulicat Dutch and overcame Timmaraja. The latter, allowed some liberty of action, abused it. The Nayak of Gingee defeated him and killed him in a battle in 1635. Venkata III set up his capital at Vellore.

He was not allowed to rule in peace. The Nayaks of Madura and Tanjore, resenting what they regarded as his partiality for their brother of Gingee, stirred up trouble. That was soon ended. But Sriranga turned traitor and engineered two invasions by Bijapur forces in 1638 and 1641. The first, which brought the Muslims to the gates of Bangalore, was bought off. The second, led by Ranadulla Khan, who was assisted by Sriranga, was staved off by the southern Nayaks outside Vellore.

By this time the English had come to Madraspatam. They watched Golconda, in its turn, invade the coast in April, 1642. Damarla Venkatapathi and another magnate, Veligotti Timma of Armagon, opposed it, but without much success. Venkata III had died on October 10 of the previous year. For much of his reign the Damarla brothers, who were his brothers-in-law, carried on the administration.

Sriranga succeeded to a disastrous situation, not a little of it of his own making. Most of the Nayaks were opposed to him, particularly Damarla Venkatapathi. The latter seems to have set up a rival claimant to the throne. His attempt failed, and he was imprisoned. His kinsmen raised a large army and 'hoped to restore him to freedom' with Muslim help or 'to ruin the whole kingdom'. Sriranga was nothing if not persevering, but at this crucial moment he wasted a whole year feasting in the company of friendly Nayaks. 'Soon vain joys gave place to jealousies and divisions,' sermonised the foreigners looking on.

Sriranga had to abandon Vellore. He took refuge at the Mysore court. He was able with Mysore's help to recover a little of his kingdom. Sivappa, the Nayak of Ikkeri, helped him win Vellore back from the Golconda forces. He was also able to repulse two more Golconda invasions.

It was at this time, in 1646, that Sriranga received William Greenhill, the Madras factor, in audience and confirmed the previous charters the English had received. But granting charters was a small matter as Sriranga surveyed the scene from Vellore. It was bleak. Golconda and Bijapur mounted invasion after invasion. The Nayaks helped or did not help as selfish interest dictated. Sriranga did gain successes, but they were temporary. Mir Jumla now appeared on the scene. Mustafa Khan, a Bijapur general, also marched on Vellore. From the depths of his despair, Sriranga made a last appeal to Hindu self-respect to rise against the invaders. The Nayaks ignored him. The invaders made considerable headway. At last, in this hour of extremity, the Nayaks realised their own peril and hastened to Sriranga's rescue, even now the Nayak of Madura holding aloof. The assistance was half-hearted. Sriranga could not follow up a success outside Vellore because his allies abandoned him.

Sriranga lost a big battle at Vrinchipuram on April 4, 1646. Mustafa besieged Vellore. On the coast Mir Jumla carried his arms down to Pulicat. Sriranga took refuge at Tanjore. When that town too, like Gingee, fell in 1659, he went to Belur to die. He died in 1672, and with him died the Vijayanagar empire founded by Harihara and Bukka in an earlier hour of mortal peril.

However, the Hindu cause was not lost. A champion arose in an unexpected quarter. Shivaji the Mahratta crowned himself two years after Sriranga's death. His magnificent feats of arms and the courage he instilled in the fainting Hindu heart more than made up for his own father's selfish folly.

The Mahrattas appear in Deccan history first through Shahji. As a general in Bijapur service, he served as second in command to Ranadullah Khan, who attacked Ikkeri in 1636. He took part in later campaigns against Kenge Hanuma of Basavapatnam and the Nayak of Ikkeri again. He defeated Kanthiriva Narasa of Srirangapatna. In 1644 he was made governor of the conquered provinces, Bangalore being his headquarters.

Shahji's relations with Bijapur were equivocal. The court did

not quite trust this Hindu, particularly as he made conquest after conquest. In 1648 he was arrested before Gingee, which he was besieging. But he had to be set free. He returned to the Carnatic in 1651 and set himself to restore order in the region. Meanwhile, Golconda and Bijapur came to blows over a division of the spoils. Sriranga had the opportunity of recovering some part of his dominions. But when he was meeting with fair success, the Nayak of Madura betrayed him, and he had to flee.

Bijapur forces captured Penukonda in 1653 and wished to march to Gingee through Mir Jumla's territory. The latter refused them permission. He also instigated Sriranga and the Mysore ruler to fight the Bijapur forces. But when Sriranga took him at his word, all that resulted was that he himself was besieged at Vellore. A treaty which followed left him only Chandragiri and the revenue of certain districts. This was in 1653.

A momentous event happened three years later when Mir Jumla abandoned Golconda for the Mughals. Sriranga returned to the charge and again met with some success. He entrusted to Koneri Chetty military operations against Pulicat, where Mir Jumla had placed his treasures. But Koneri betrayed the emperor. This disaster led to further diminution of Vijayanagar territory. By 1688 the empire on the coast passed into Golconda's hands.

Meanwhile, Shahji had been tending his province, but he had always to be fighting. The area of his operations extended from the west coast to about Gingee in the east and from the Godavari in the north to about Tanjore in the south. Tanjore fell in 1659. Shahji was arrested again in 1663. But he was set free again. He returned to the Carnatic to help Bijapur forces reduce refractory chiefs in Shimoga district. He died in 1664 of injuries sustained while hunting. The Mahratta presence in the Carnatic was confirmed when Bijapur bestowed Tanjore as a 'jagir' on Ekoji, a son of Shahji and an elder half-brother of Shivaji.

The arrival of the Mahrattas created considerable consternation in Fort St. George. But Shahji's place in history is not as the hammer of the foreigners, but as the hammer of Hinduism and Vijayanagar. That he should have been the father of the great restorer of Hinduism is an irony of history.

It is easy to see from this recital of battle and invasion that the Deccan was bleeding to death. There was probably not a single year in the seventeenth century when there was not fighting some-

where or other. It was an enfeebled and demoralised people who, in the next century, still persisting in suicidal war, allowed themselves to be utilised by foreigners for the latter's own purposes.

12

Four Men

Most personalities of Indian history are shadowy figures. It is not possible to understand what manner of men they were. Their panegyrists are worse than useless. These do not scruple to call a chief of a few districts the lord of the three worlds or to ascribe to him all the qualities of human perfection. Deeds speak louder than words, and it is from their deeds that an attempt should be made to evaluate their personality. Since genuine evidence is extremley scarce, most Indian monarchs of old have survived only as monumental effigies.

Little evidence is forthcoming about the Damarla brothers, the two of the four persons concerned with the founding of Madras. Even their career has not been made out clearly. They inherited magnateship from their father, Chennappa, and they were fond or respectful enough of his memory to name after him a town they set up. Venkatapathi seems virtually to have ruled the empire for Venkata III, his brother-in-law. This was not because the latter was incompetent, but following what may be called delegation of responsibility. Ayappa governed a small region from Poonamallee.

Venkatapathi seems to have been a typical Naik of those difficult times. He was retentive of his position and privileges and when, on Sriranga III's accession, he lost them he was not above calling in the Sultans. The emperor imprisoned him. It speaks for the affection and respect he inspired in his brother and other nobles that they gathered an army to attempt to free him. They succeeded, but Venkatapathi never regained imperial favour. After a time his place was given to 'Mollay'.

Ayappa seems to have made up with the emperor, to judge from the fact that he fought for him at the battle of Erode about

1670. He lost his life in that battle which represented virtually the final attempt of Sriranga's to recover power.

This is almost all that is known of the Damarla brothers. But for the fact that they were involved in the founding of Madras they would be lost except to specialised history. If it was they who invited the English to Madraspatam, it indicates concern for the prosperity of the empire with perhaps a dim notion of the advantages of foreign trade. If, as is more likely, it was the English who made the overtures, the alacrity with which the brothers accepted them also suggests a concern for the well-being of the people. The foundation of Chennapatnam was an act of statesmanship. The Naik was perturbed at the repeated brawls between the Pulicat Dutch and the Santhome Portuguese. Evidently because the founding of the town did not serve the purpose he supported the English in their endeavour.

Andrew Cogan and Francis Day come alive in the official correspondence of the English. Cogan, the son-in-law of a knight, a fact which counted for something in those days, was not inclined to think humbly of himself. He entered the company's service in 1615 when very young, and served in the East Indies, chiefly at Bantam. He returned to England in 1629 or 1630 under a cloud. The reason was private trading, that bugbear of the company, which never realised that its factors, whom it paid beggarly salaries, could not possibly refrain from trying to improve on them on their own account. The company filed a bill in Chancery against him and some other factors. The matter was compromised.

By 1638 Cogan had made it up with the company which that year appointed him a member of the Surat council. He made himself felt at Surat soon. He suggested a restructuring of the administration on the west coast, a fact which speaks to his enterprise and independence. Though a newcomer, he was selected to proceed to Goa to discuss some issues with the Viceroy there.

Cogan was successful in his mission. He was also successful at Golconda beyond his expectations. There is something amusing about the heightened manner in which he speaks of this success, particularly in calling the Chief Minister his special friend, though they must have been meeting for the first time. In part this must have been due to his desire to impress the factors at Masulipatam when his dispute with Ivy over the Agentship was pending. He succeeded in his efforts, the agency deciding in his favour partly

because he had achieved notable things at Golconda.

The man's character comes out during his dispute with Ivy. He is anxious to avoid brawls, but will not give up his rights. He knows that he has right on his side, and that he has only to wait to gain his objective. He is able to impose his personality on his colleagues at Masulipatam. They lose little time in accepting him at his own valuation. There must have been something quietly masterful about him.

This episode is adequately documented, but not the much more important one leading to the founding of Madras. Cogan reveals himself, to judge from the rather scanty evidence, as determined enough to remove to Madraspatam. But there is nothing in him of the almost febrile anxiety that Day reveals. He is content to let matters take their course, though convinced that the issue could be carried to a successful conclusion. If he does not thrust himself forward into the scene, it is because he has the reserve, the inner strength of the man in authority. His was an age which dearly loved a lord. The future baronet and the present son-in-law of a knight was not likely to forget his position in society, though he found himself now among merchants and other breeds without the law.

The great controversy over the responsibility for building the fort shows Cogan in less agreeable light. He seems to have been genuinely convinced that Surat had authorised him to construct the fort. But when he realises that the company is determined to bring him to account he has little hesitation in throwing the blame on Day. That, in effect, the company finally vindicated his stand does not remove the disagreeable impression that in self-interest he is prepared to abandon colleagues.

It is probable that Cogan, who made much money in India, but hazarded his fortune in the royalist cause, considered his support for King Charles more important than his part in founding a settlement on a foreign strand six thousand miles away. King Charles lost despite Andrew's Cogan's support, but Madraspatam developed into one of the great cities of the east and led ultimately to the development of the British Indian empire. Thus are men mocked by history. It does seem strange that the British, much addicted to erecting memorials, completely ignored Cogan.

Francis Day belonged to a different order of society from Cogan. He was of the class from which factors at this time and for a long time to come were drawn. Like most of his colleagues and also most

of his successors, Day was accused of private trading. He seems to have been involved in some transactions with the Curtenians which he had to explain away. He was also accused of drinking and roystering. But whether Andrew Trumballl, who makes the charges, is to be relied on is doubtful.

Day's place in history derives from his part in the founding of the city. Otherwise there is nothing remarkable about him. But, if he is popularly regarded as the founder of Madras, he deserves that distinction if only for his pertinacity in pursuing his object. He acts as if he had received a personal injury at Armagon, so whole-hearted is his detestation of that place. His ardour for a settlement at Madraspatam is correspondingly high. The man did not lack energy in achieving an object on which his heart was set. He pursues it almost as if his life were at stake. This attitude should be compared with the official moderation of Cogan.

While the company in London was bound to take a longer view of the problem, its officials on the spot took limited views, none more so than Day. He seems only to have wanted to remove from Armagon at any cost. He exaggerated the advantages of the new site he had selected to make it attractive in the eyes of his employers. Francis Day was very determined to settle down at Madraspatam and, if only for this, he has a secure place in the early history of the city.

Two Indians, of humbler status than the Damarla brothers, figure in early Madras history. Beri Timmappa, originally from Palacole, is said by one of his descendants to have helped the English in the negotiations with the Damarla brothers. Nothing else is known of him.

Seshadri 'Nague' of Porto Novo bulks large. He was the company's first Merchant at Madraspatam. After long years of satisfactory service he was superseded under Ivy's administration because he had become much indebted. He engaged in a bitter quarrel with his successors. This was of a piece with what was to happen later, the dissensions among the factors who took sides in similar disputes.

At least a few other Indians must have figured in the early developments at Madraspatam, but the available records do not speak of them.

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No records prior to 1670 have survived at Madras.